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NEOLIBERAL PENALITY: 
THE BIRTH OF NATURAL ORDER, 
THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt 
 
 
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society 
is to prevent people from bypassing the system of 
voluntary, compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit 
or implicit—in situations where, because transaction 
costs are low, the market is a more efficient method of 
allocating resources than forced exchange… When 
transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by 
definition, the most efficient method of allocating 
resources. Attempts to bypass the market will therefore be 
discouraged by a legal system bent on promoting 
efficiency. 
 
                         Richard Posner (1985) 
 
 
Preface 
 
We face today one of the greatest financial crises in Western capitalism. 
The collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the nationalization 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal bailouts of A.I.G. and 
Washington Mutual, the fire sale of Merrill Lynch, and the ongoing 
federal rescue program all attest to the magnitude of our current crisis.  
 
In this sense, the timing of this essay—the culmination of over 
two years of ongoing historical research—could hardly be worse. The 
central premise of the essay is that most people in the United States 
believe that the market is the most efficient mechanism to allocate 
resources. The events of 2008 challenge this central premise and are 
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forcing the American people, more than ever, to reexamine the need for 
the regulation of the free market.  
 
In another sense, however, the timing of this essay is, sadly, 
perfect. Perfect because its purpose is precisely to question the meaning 
of the very phrase “the need for the regulation of the free market” and to 
suggest that it is the belief in the duality of those two central terms—
regulation and free market—that is one of the greatest problems we face 
today. The terms, as well as their companion expressions, “market 
efficiency,” “natural order,” “self-adjusting markets,” etc., are illusory 
and misleading categories that fail to capture the individual 
distinctiveness of different forms of market organization and mask the 
redistributions of wealth that characterize our peculiar mode of market 
organization.  
 
This essay asks the question, what work do these categories of 
“natural order” and “market efficiency” do for us? What do we achieve 
when we distribute regulatory market mechanisms into the two 
categories—the free and the constrained—and then judge them on that 
basis alone? The answer: We have developed these categories in order to 
place what are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena in a coherent 
frame and to deploy simplistic heuristic devices to expedite our 
evaluation of different forms of economic organization. In the process, 
we have created categories that are responsible, first, for facilitating our 
growing penal sphere, and, second, for naturalizing and thereby masking 
the redistributive consequences associated with different methods of 
organizing markets.  
 
The idea of natural order, born in the eighteenth century, is 
precisely what gave birth to neoliberal penality, a discourse on economy 
and society in which the government is pushed out of the economic 
sphere, relegated to the boundary, and given free rein there—and there 
alone—to expand, intervene, and punish, often severely. The concept of 
market efficiency also naturalizes and thereby hides the choices, 
policies, norms, regulations, and laws that we use to administer markets, 
and as a consequence, makes us not analyze neutrally and open-
mindedly the mechanisms that regulate the market.  
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The ultimate aspiration of this essay is to cease using those 
terms—natural order, market efficiency, the free market, or even 
regulated markets—and instead begin the arduous task of evaluating 
different proposals for the organization of society based on a meticulous 
comparison of the distributional effects associated with competing 
mechanisms necessary to supervise and administer a system of economic 
and social exchange.  
 
The story begins, though, very far away in time and place, in the 
Parisian markets of the eighteenth century, with the establishment of the 
lieutenant générale de police du Châtelet de Paris and the “police” of 
bakers, grain merchants, and markets.  
 
 
I. 
 
In early May 1739, commissioner Emmanuel Nicolas Parisot was doing 
his rounds in the Marais. As the investigator, examiner, and royal 
counselor responsible for the Saint-Antoine district, Parisot reported to 
René Hérault, lieutenant général de police at the Châtelet of Paris, the 
royal palace of justice. Parisot was at the Saint-Paul market going from 
baker to baker, weighing their bread, when he discovered at Jean 
Thyou’s stand “four three-pound breads each light one-and-a-half 
ounces.”1 At about the same time, commissioner Charles, also doing his 
rounds, discovered at Courtois’ bakery on rue de Chantre “one bread 
labeled eight pounds in weight, light two ounces, two others marked the 
same weight one ounce light each, six labeled four pounds in weight 
each one ounce off, another six pound bread light one ounce and a half, 
two others labeled six pounds in weight, eight others marked four pounds 
in weight, all a half ounce light.”2 Another commissioner, Delespinay, 
found a cache of underweight breads in a small room hidden in the back 
of Aublay’s bakery shop on the vieille rue du Temple. Delespinay 
immediately seized the bread and had it sent to the Sisters of the Charity 
of the Saint-Gervais parish.3 (Commissioner Charles had sent his 
confiscated bread to the Capuchin friars on the rue Saint Honoré and to 
                                                 
1 Freminville 1758 :78. 
2 Freminville 1758 : 78-79. 
3 Freminville 1758 :79. 
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the poor at the parish of Saint-Germain l’Auxerrois.)4 When the 
lieutenant de police held court the following May 5th, 1739, Hérault 
condemned the bakers but showed mercy and “this time only” sentenced 
each to only fifty livres in fines.5 
 
Later the same month, the 29th of May, master baker Amand, an 
elected syndic in charge of his community of master bakers, found 
himself accused of selling a loaf of bread in his shop—specifically, “one 
white bread weighing four pounds, at eleven sols”—at a higher price 
than market—to be exact, “three deniers for each pound above the 
common market price.”6 Hérault declared Amand guilty, fined him three 
hundred livres, and stripped him of his elected office. In the sentencing 
order, Hérault ordered the other syndics to assemble within three days of 
the publication of his sentence and to proceed in their office to the 
election of a new syndic.7 A week earlier, Hérault had convicted Marie-
Hebert Heguin of buying grain at market for resale and fined her 1,000 
livres.8 A royal ordinance prohibited buying grain with the intention of 
reselling it: “It is permitted to purchase grain at market for one’s use; 
however, it is not permitted to buy grain for resale: the reason, very 
simply, is that he who buys for purposes of resale must necessarily gain 
from the transaction and, as a result, will sell it at a higher price than 
market rate, which constitutes a punishable monopoly.”9  
 
 It is in these terms that Me. Edme de la Poix de Freminville 
described the Parisian grain markets in his Dictionnaire ou traité de la 
police générale published in 1758, in which he collected, assembled, 
organized, classified, reported and reprinted a myriad of these sentences 
and royal ordinances. A manual of policing, a compendium of 
disciplinary practices, Freminville’s dictionary codified alphabetically a 
gamut of rules and prescriptions covering not only subsistence—grains, 
bread, meats, fish, poultry, oysters, and legumes—but also gaming, 
sanitation, religious practice, guilds, sexual mores, even the charivaria. 
                                                 
4 Freminville 1758 :79. 
5 Freminville 1758 :79. 
6 Freminville 1758 :73. 
7 Freminville 1758 :73. 
8 Freminville 1758:502. 
9 Freminville 1758 :501. This ordinance was also enforced by sentences on July 8, 
1740, and August 11, 1741 – fining for 1,000 livres. See Freminville 1758 :503-505. 
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Advertised as a “Work necessary to all officers of the police and officers 
of justice, where they will find each and every one of their obligations 
and functions classified by each term, necessary as well to all 
prosecutors and practicing attorneys; & equally useful to priests, 
churchwardens, … merchants, … & others,”10 the dictionary contained 
564 pages of the most minute regulation of, well, practically everything.  
 
 Freminville was intimately familiar with these ordinances. 
Himself a bailli for the village and surroundings of Lapalisse in the 
Auvergne region of central France, Freminville had similar magisterial 
powers in his countryside as a lieutenant général de police would have 
had in Paris.11 Freminville published his dictionary more than fifty years 
after the first volume of Delamare’s famous Traité de Police had 
appeared in 1705—the first of four massive in-folio tomes documenting 
and tracing in intricate detail the history of the police of Paris. 
Freminville, though, targeted a wider audience with his dictionary. 
Whereas Delamare had written for the urban police officer—especially 
the Parisian police administrator—Freminville pitched his treatise to the 
far more numerous country magistrates and prosecutors—the many 
procureurs fiscaux, who resided in each village in France and 
administered the police function, meting out justice and regulating all 
aspects of daily life. By alphabetizing the rules and making them 
available in a more concise, single volume, in-quarto, Freminville sought 
to disseminate the disciplinary rules further, to publicize them, to make 
them known—in their finest detail.12  
                                                 
10 Freminville 1758 :i (cover page). 
11 A bailli was the functional equivalent of a lieutenant général de police  or an English 
sheriff  in more rural areas outside of Paris. It was an office retained important 
regulatory and administrative functions throughout the ancient régime—including the 
authority to set market prices. See generally Olivier-Martin 1988:66-73. For a 
biographical entry on Freminville, see des Essarts 1800, vol.3, p. 153-154.  
12 Freminville prefaces his work with an acknowledgement to Delamare’s famous 
treatise, all the while signaling the broader reach of his own text and the greater 
practicality or applicability of his treatise:« Il semblerait qu’après le Traité de Police de 
M. de Lamare, personne ne devrait hasarder d’écrire sur cette matière, qui est 
approfondie avec toute l’érudition & la science que l’on peut desirer,” Freminville 
began. « Mais si l’on considère que … quatre gros volumes in-folio que contiennent ce 
Traité ne se trouvent pas aisément chez tous les Officiers de Police de la campagne… 
[et] en y ajoutant ceux qui sont intervenus depuis trente-quatre ans de l’impression de 
ce Traité, c’est ce que j’ai tâché de ramasser ; & afin d’en faciliter la lecture, je l’ai mis 
 
 
 
Neoliberal Penality 6 
 
 
“Transgression of laws and ordinances are crimes both large and 
small, but however slight they may be, the ministry of the procureur 
fiscal must not tolerate them,” Freminville observed. “To despise but 
ignore small mistakes is to allow larger ones, and impunity throws 
villains into new infidelities.”13 Quoting Saint-Bernard, from Book 3 of 
de Consideratione, Freminville declared that impunity is the “daughter 
of negligence, mother of insolence, source of impudence, nurse of 
iniquity and of transgressions of law.”14 He concluded: “The officer 
whose role is to suppress anything that deviates from what is prescribed 
as orderly must not neglect, even with respect to minor things, to punish 
those who contravene.”15 
 
 Oddly, Freminville himself was deeply skeptical of these 
ordinances and opposed the restrictions on commerce associated with the 
regulation of the grain and bread markets. Freminville was a partisan of 
free trade, he professed. “It is indeed a delicate matter to tinker with the 
price of grain and its commerce, because he who regulates with an eye to 
reducing the market price often discovers that, as a result of unforeseen 
circumstances, the very regulations that he crafted, far from reducing it, 
raise the price and reduce the supply of the goods in question.”16 To 
Freminville, the little-known author of the well-known Essai sur la 
Police générale des Grains, sur leurs prix, &c., published anonymously 
in London in 1753, was entirely right when he declared that “by far the 
wisest and best policy to adopt is to grant merchants who commerce in 
grain absolute liberty, and to allow them to transport grain from one 
province to another, which is most fortunately what is now currently 
allowed under the King’s declaration of September 17, 1754.”17 
 
Freminville was a free trader and believed that self-interest would 
serve to ensure an abundant supply of wheat and barley. This, he 
                                                                                                                       
par forme de Dictionnaire, & ai rapporté à chaque terme les Ordonnances & Arrêts qui 
en font la décision. »  (Freminville 1758 :iii). 
13 Freminville 1758:vii. 
14 Freminville 1758 :vii-viii.  
15 Freminville 1758 :viii. 
16 Freminville 1758 :267. 
17 Freminville 1758 :267 (the author of the anonymous text was Claude-Jacques 
Herbert). 
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thought, was self-evident and demonstrated practically every day: 
whereas, for instance, the grain reserves maintained by the state and 
provinces had to be thrown in the river, rotten and infested, private 
individuals preserved their stock well in their granaries. “Such waste 
would never happen with an individual,” Freminville observed, “because 
it is their own property.”18 Private property and personal interest would 
help forestall such sordid outcomes and prevent the recurring grain 
shortages—les disettes, as they were called—that plagued France.  
 
Many other historians of the Parisian grain and bread markets 
would share Freminville’s curious, almost morbid fascination with the 
intricate details of the ordinances, royal declarations, and sentences. 
Though they too often favored free commerce, they were seduced by the 
maze of market regulations—as if they couldn’t not look. The leading 
historical treatment from the nineteenth century on the police des 
grains—the treatise most often cited in later works—is itself the product 
of an arch opponent of market regulation. Georges Afanassiev, the 
privat-docent at the University of Odessa in Russia, was a scholar of 
Turgot who later turned to the commerce of grain. Afanassiev spent two 
years conducting archival research in Paris in the early 1890’s and 
produced a thorough and well-documented text, Le Commerce des 
céréales en France au dix-huitième siècle, originally printed in Russian, 
translated into French, and published in Paris in 1894. Afanassiev 
opposed these market regulations, yet studied them in an equally 
obsessive manner, captivated by their intricacy and complexity. The 
leading contemporary treatment of the police des grains, Steven 
Kaplan’s magisterial two-volume book, Bread, Politics and Political 
Economy in the Reign of Louis XV, though remarkably balanced and 
erudite, also discloses a slight preference for liberalization. “In many of 
its particulars,” Kaplan admitted, “the liberal bill of indictment [of the 
police des grains] was well founded.”19 Kaplan adds, “The [liberal] grain 
reforms were a devastating critique of the police practices we have 
discussed.”20  
 
Despite his free trade ideology, then, Freminville dissected and 
catalogued, reported, cried—much like the sentences themselves were 
                                                 
18 Freminville 1758 :267.  
19 Kaplan 1976:Vol.2:680. 
20 Kaplan 1976:Vol.2:682. 
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cried at market—and decried the intricate details of myriad rules and 
regulations. Of Freminville’s lengthy book, ninety pages concern the 
cultivation and commerce of grain, the sale of bread, the regulation of 
the boulangers, meuniers, etc. That represents a full sixth of the entire 
dictionary. And it covered everything from prohibiting the purchase of 
grain on the stalk to prohibiting anyone from walking in fields that have 
been sown (especially to pick flowers); from fixing the hours of sale to 
fixing the dates for harvesting; from prohibiting speech that would tend 
to raise grain prices to requiring seminaries and colleges to warehouse 
three years worth of grain at all times.  
 
All sales, naturally, were to take place at market. “It is forbidden, 
first, to sell or buy grains outside the market. The age-old prohibitions on 
this question, which dated back to the fourteenth century, had never been 
repealed, and since 1709 had been taken up again and applied more or 
less strictly.”21 Freminville reported that the police of the Châtelet, by 
sentence dated February 20, 1728, convicted a man named Lorillard for 
having sold “two muids of quality flour . . . outside of the market 
square.”22 Another police sentence, dated May 27, 1729, condemned 
several merchants—Petit, Chateaudun, and the son, René Petit—for 
having sold sixteen muids of wheat elsewhere than at market, and fined 
them each a thousand livres.23 There are similar sentences recorded for 
February 29, 1731, January 31, 1738, and August 3, 1742 – all for selling 
grain or flour off-market.24 In the police sentence dated January 11, 
1737, the lieutenant général “renewed the prohibitions applicable to all 
bakers, millers, brewers, and the like, against buying any grain or flour, 
and to all farmers, farm laborers, and the like, against selling the same, 
by specimen or sample, anywhere within eight leagues of Paris.”25 
 
To ensure that all sales were conducted at market, other 
regulations imposed an obligation to certify market sales. A sentence 
issued in the police tribunal of the old Châtelet, dated October 10, 1681, 
confirms the confiscation of a “muid (measure) of flour in fifteen bags” 
for not having obtained a “certificate from where such merchandise was 
                                                 
21 Weulersse 1910, vol. I :534. 
22 Freminville 1758: 451.  
23 Freminville 1758: 451-52. 
24 Freminville 1758 :452. 
25 Freminville 1758 :454. 
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bought,” and for failing to turn over the goods “to the measurers upon 
arrival at the doors and barriers” of the city.26 It is interesting to note that 
the inspection here had been conducted by “Marie Claude Croisette, the 
elder, agent of the guild (Communauté) of the elected syndics of 
measurers of grain and flour of the city, fauxbourgs, and banlieus of 
Paris.”27 The police were not the only investigators but were assisted by 
the syndics of the merchant communities—and often, it was the other 
way around too.  
 
Once at the market, producers were forbidden to sell their grain 
and flour before a specified hour—an hour that varied according to the 
season. The eighteenth-century regulations followed daylight savings 
time.28 “The opening of trading day in the markets and ports of Paris was 
fixed by a series of ordinances,” Afanassiev tells us. “From Easter to 
Saint-Rémy, sales began at eight o’clock in the morning; from Saint-
Rémy to Easter, at nine o’clock. In the provincial markets, market days 
and opening hours were determined the same way.”29 There were also 
rules about who could buy first at market. “Typically, the opening [of the 
market] was reserved for private individuals,” Afanassiev writes, “that is 
to say, those who were neither bakers nor traders. Members of this latter 
group were not admitted until later. In Paris, they did not have the right 
to come to the market or be represented there before noon, nor could 
they even talk with vendors near the perimeter of the market.”30 
Freminville adds: “It is forbidden for all innkeepers, hoteliers, and 
cabaret owners to buy on days of markets and fairs . . . before eight 
o’clock in the morning from Easter to the first of October, and before 
nine o’clock from the first of October to Easter.”31  
 
Other ordinances punished speech that could tend to increase the 
price of grain: “It is not permitted to hold, spread, or publish any speech 
that could prevent [the sale of grain] at the fixed price, nor to suggest 
                                                 
26 Sentence de la Chambre de police du Châtelet, qui déclare valable une saisie d’un 
muid de farine, à la requête du procureur des jurés mesureurs de grain. 10 octobre 
1681. Paris : M. Le Prest (s.d.).  
27 Id. 
28 See Ph. Rur. Chap. XI, p. 364; Lettre a un ami, pp. 90-93. 
29 Afanassiev 1894:71 (relying on Delamare, t. II, p. 81). 
30 Afanassiev 1894:71 (relying on Ordonnance de décembre 1672). 
31 Freminville 1758:468. 
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that the cost of grain will increase, that there isn’t any grain at such and 
such place, or that it is worth a lot more elsewhere; speech of this nature 
tends to cause the price to increase,” Freminville explained.32 A police 
sentence of the Châtelet dated July 22, 1740, fined a man named Fieffé 
2,000 livres for having “held in the Gonesse market speech that tended to 
alarm the public and to raise the price of grain.”33 What, exactly, was the 
nature of his speech? The squire Martin Rulhier, the sheriff of the Île-de-
France and commander of the brigade of Saint Denis, had gone to the 
Gonesse market to “investigate any violations that could have been 
committed against the spirit of the king’s declarations, the judgments of 
parliament, and the regulations and sentences of the police…”34 The 
widow Bethemont, baker at Gonesse, told him that a certain Fieffé, a 
farmer, had refused to sell her his nine septiers of wheat at the common 
market price. “He would only sell the wheat thirty livres, whereas the 
highest price that day had been twenty-six livres; she [the widow 
Bethemont] had offered twenty-seven, at which he replied that for that 
price he would prefer to pack it up, especially since he had gotten thirty-
three livres at Pont, twenty-eight at Dammartin, and thirty-two at 
Nanteuil-le-Hardouin. He said he would sell it on at the next market, and 
in effect packed up his nine septiers of wheat.”35 The police lieutenant 
characterized this speech as “tending to alarm the public, cause sedition, 
increase the price of grain, and consequently that of bread.”36 
 
According to Freminville, the grain trade had to be one of the 
main concerns of the county prosecutor. Freminville repeatedly 
underscored the importance of the market regulations: grain and grain 
markets, he affirmed, “should constitute the largest and principal 
responsibility of the Procurer Fiscal.”37 “We are dealing here with the 
lives of our fellow humans, and it is imperative that they not be 
sacrificed to the monopolists who meddle in selling and reselling 
grain.”38 Freminville’s dictionary covered the grain industry 
exhaustively, and there were in fact so many regulations of the market 
                                                 
32 Freminville 1758:213. 
33 Freminville 1758:213. 
34 Freminville 1758:213. 
35 Freminville 1758:214. 
36 Freminville 1758:214. 
37 Freminville 1758:166. 
38 Freminville 1758:266.  
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that, for the dictionary entry on “Marchés”—the entry on markets—
Freminville merely refers the reader, by cross reference, to another 
entry.39 His dictionary reads: 
 
MARKETS.    SEE   POLICE. 
 
To our modern eyes, the Parisian police des grains—that intricate 
and extensive web of royal decrees and ordinances that governed every 
minute aspect of the commerce of grain under the ancient régime and 
that gave rise to what has been called “the grain wars of the eighteenth 
century”40—has come to symbolize excessive government control and 
intervention. The policing of the grain trade—that tangled lattice of 
edicts and decrees intended to keep down the price of bread in Paris and 
the provinces—stands today as a labyrinth, a maze, a morass of 
regulations, of minute government tinkering in the most atomic details of 
the commercial exchange.  
 
Codes, dictionaries, and treatises of the police would proliferate 
in the mid-eighteenth century to catalogue and disseminate these 
ordinances. The 1750s and 60s were an important period—not, naturally, 
for the codification of rules themselves. That had been recurring since at 
least the sixteenth century and the important dates were well known: the 
réglements of 1567 and 1577, the déclaration of August 31, 1699 or 
April 19, 1723. No, the mid-eighteenth century was an important period 
for the dissemination of the rules, for the cataloguing, for publicizing the 
regulations. 1758 marked not only the publication of Freminville’s 
Dictionnaire, but also of Duchesne’s Code de la police, ou analyse des 
réglemens de police, divisé en douze titres. Originally published in Paris 
the year before, Duchesne’s popular treatise would already be reprinted a 
year later and it compiled, in over 480 pages, all the police rules and 
regulations that extended over the areas of religion, customs, health, 
science and liberal arts, commerce, manufacture, mechanical arts, 
servants, domestics, and the poor. Within the policing of commerce 
alone, Duchesne had chapters on weights and measures, on fairs and 
markets, on the commerce in grain, wine, livestock, candles, wood and 
                                                 
39 Freminville 1758:367 (« MARCHÉS.  V. POLICE. »). 
40 “La guerre du blé au XVIIIe siècle” is the very title of an excellent collection of 
writings on the topic. See Gauthier and Ikni 1988. 
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wool—to name a few—and on merchants, their agents, currency 
exchanges, and banks. 1758 also marked the publication of the first 
volumes of the Code Louis XV: Recueil des principaux Edits, 
déclarations, Ordonnances, Arrêts, Sentences et réglemens concernant 
la justice, police et finances depuis 1722 jusqu'en 1740. The Recueil 
would assemble all the important ordinances and sentences on policing 
and grow to a twelve volume set, in-12.41 Numerous other codes, 
including Deslandes’ 1767 Code de la police ou analyse des réglemens 
de police, divisé en douze titres, would be published and reprinted in 
Paris during the period.  
 
It was precisely this maze of ordinances that Adam Smith, in The 
Wealth of Nations, castigated as “such absurd regulations, as frequently 
aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth, into the dreadful 
calamity of a famine”42 or as “the folly of human laws.”43 It was an 
economic approach, Smith would famously suggest, that “embraced all 
the prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a 
system of restraint and regulation.”44 And still today, we characterize the 
period as excessively regulated, over-regulated, a frenzy of market 
intervention—the minute regulation of the smallest infraction. Order-
maintenance at the most micro level.   
 
 
II. 
   
The contrast could not be greater with our perception of contemporary 
markets—whether in grain or more broadly. Today we tend to view 
modern markets and commodity exchanges as relatively free. Commerce 
has been liberalized, the forces of free market exchange have been 
unleashed, and the constraints of the past lifted. Self-adjusting market 
mechanisms have replaced the police des grains and, in a far more 
efficient manner, ensure reasonable prices and abundant supply. Though 
globalization and population growth loom on the horizon as a potential 
                                                 
41 Code Louis XV: 1758-60. 
42 Smith 1976 II:48 [Bk. IV, Ch. V]. 
43 Smith 1976 II:50. 
44 Smith 1976 II:182 [Bk. IV, Ch. IX]. 
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threat to the adequate supply of commodities, voluntary and free market 
exchange at home is the model of choice.   
 
 “[T]he close of the twentieth century saw a virtual canonization 
of market organization as the best, indeed the only effective, way to 
structure an economic system,” observes professor Richard Nelson at 
Columbia University.45 As J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer 
add, “Throughout Eastern and Western Europe as well as in North 
America during the 1980s, there was a dramatic shift toward a popular 
belief in the efficacy of self-adjusting market mechanisms. Indeed, the 
apparent failure of Keynesian economic policies, the strains faced by the 
Swedish social democratic model, and the collapse of Eastern bloc 
economies led many journalistic observers to argue that capitalism is a 
system of free markets that has finally triumphed.”46  Nelson captures the 
dominant, orthodox view succinctly: 
 
For-profit firms are the vehicles of production. They 
decide what to produce and how, on the basis of their 
assessments about what is most profitable…. Competition 
among firms assures that production is efficient and 
tailored to what users want, and prices are kept in line 
with costs. The role of government is limited to 
establishing and maintaining a body of law to set the rules 
for the market game and assuring the availability of basic 
infrastructure needed for the economy to operate.47 
 
Nelson concedes that this is a simplified version of “the standard 
textbook model in economics,”48 perhaps even a bit “folk theory.”49 But 
it is, in broad outline, an accurate description of a dominant view that has 
had a powerful influence on the latter part of the twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. As Boyer suggests, accurately I believe, “The 
market is now considered by a majority of managers and politicians as 
                                                 
45 Nelson 2005a:1. Leading exponents of this view include Francis Fukuyama (1992), 
Daniel Yergen and Joseph Stanislaw (1998), and others.   
46 Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997a:1. 
47 Nelson 2005a:1. 
48 Nelson 2005a:1. 
49 Nelson 2005a:1. 
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the coordinating mechanism ‘par excellence.’”50 The financial crisis of 
2008 has shaken these beliefs, but has not displaced them.  
 
This standard view generally traces to the Chicago School of 
Economics and its founders, Milton Friedman and George Stigler. For 
the educated reader of the New York Times, the tenets of the Chicago 
School are usefully summarized by the economics columnist, David 
Leonhardt, in the following terms: “The Chicago School believes that 
markets—that is, millions of individuals making separate decisions—
almost always function better than economies that are managed by 
governments. In a market system, prices adjust whenever there is a 
shortage or a glut, and the problem soon resolves itself. Just as 
important, companies constantly compete with each other, which helps 
bring down prices, improves the quality of goods and ultimately lifts 
living standards.”51 
 
To be sure, many commentators today, especially law scholars 
and lawyers who toil in the regulatory domain, consider this “free market 
libertarian” version of the Chicago School a bit of an extreme position. 
Even some of the staunchest Chicago School adherents have themselves 
softened their claims to allow for slightly more governmental 
intervention in cases of market failure due to collective action, 
monopolistic, or other coordination problems. Richard Epstein, for 
instance, has softened his libertarian edge with age and embraced a more 
welfarist position. “My ideal government is not quite as small as [I 
suggested in the 1970s], but it is still much smaller than the massive 
government in place today,” Epstein states. “Thus it is not sufficient to 
assume that the only forms of conduct accompanied by undesirable 
social consequences are those involving the use of force or fraud…. [A] 
more comprehensive social statement seeks to maximize social welfare, 
embracing the libertarian prohibitions, but going beyond them to allow 
certain forms of regulation and taxation to overcome these otherwise 
intractable coordination problems.”52 Similarly, Richard Posner has 
softened his libertarianism with pragmatism.53   
 
                                                 
50 Boyer 1997:57. 
51 Leonhardt 2008:31. 
52 Epstein 1996:2. 
53 Harcourt, UC Law Review 2007. 
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 Nevertheless, the more extreme market libertarian position has 
helped shape a more moderate view that is dominant today: the view that 
government intervention in the economic domain tends to be inefficient 
and should therefore be avoided. What characterizes this more moderate 
view is a set of softer a priori assumptions that are reflected, especially, 
in the rhetoric of economic debate. In contrast to the more extreme 
rhetoric of the Chicago School—for instance, the argument that the free 
market is practically always more efficient—market liberals suggest that 
government intervention tends to be less efficient; that it is generally the 
case that market mechanisms work better, in part because of lower 
transaction costs, but also because market participants are better 
information gatherers and tend to be more invested in the ultimate 
outcome; and that government agencies suffer from greater principal-
agent problems, are less nimble at adjusting to changing market 
conditions, and become more entrenched and subject to interest group 
capture. These are familiar arguments and, together, they tend to 
promote a loose default position that favors market mechanisms over 
“regulation”—a tilt in favor of markets. For simplicity, I will refer to this 
set of ideas as “neoliberalism.”54     
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, this view helped bring 
about a wave of privatization in the United States and abroad, in Great 
Britain.55 The momentum has continued since that time and the effects of 
                                                 
54 The term “neoliberal” is used in this essay to capture at least four important 
dimensions. The first is the simplest and represents a historical element. It distinguishes 
late twentieth century thinkers like Milton Friedman and George Stigler from early 
liberal thinkers like Adam Smith and François Quesnay. The second dimension is more 
ideological. Early liberal thinkers had a set of ideas that were not yet proven or 
demonstrated; they were, in a sense, more utopian. Neoliberals are contemporary and 
thus come after a lot of history, including the Great Depression and New Deal. 
Neoliberalism has an ideological element because it tries to minimize historical market 
failures and continue to believe in the same principles as early liberals. The third 
dimension has to do with convictions about the present: neoliberalism here is the belief 
that we actually live in a free market system and that this system has triumphed. In 
other words, despite all the repeated government bail-outs, we are really in a free 
market; and despite all the repeated crises and bail-outs, free markets have prevailed. 
The final dimension is related to the central thesis of this project: neoliberalism is the 
belief that the early markets of the 18th century were completely regulated and that ours 
today are free. Neoliberalism in this fourth sense is best defined precisely as the belief 
that our markets today are free, whereas the earlier ones were excessively regulated. 
55 See, generally, Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Guttman 2000; Kosar 2006; Savas 1999.  
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privatization have been significant in a wide range of industries, from 
airlines and communications to what were often viewed as more 
traditional state and local services. The global embrace of privatization 
strengthened in the 1990s with the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
and of its political and economic influence over Eastern Europe. Today, 
the call for privatization is no longer limited to Reaganites and can be 
heard across the political spectrum—even among younger Democrats.56 
 
And this view today has infiltrated the public imagination and 
shaped public opinion. This is evident in public opinion polls—at least 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis. In a Financial Times/Harris Poll 
opinion poll conducted September 6 and 17, 2007, 49% of respondents 
in the United States answered affirmatively—in contrast to 17% who 
responded negatively—to the question “Do you think a free-market, 
capitalist economy (an economic system in which prices and wages are 
determined by unrestricted competition between businesses, with limited 
government regulation or fear of monopolies) is the best economic 
system or not?”57 In another poll, a twenty-nation poll conducted by the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of 
Maryland, researchers found that an average 71% of respondents in the 
United States agree with the statement that “The free enterprise system 
and free market economy is the best system on which to base the future 
of the world;” only 24% of respondents disagreed with that statement.58 
 
Until very recently, this dominant view was reinforced daily in 
the leading newspapers, in the media, and through the voice of our 
                                                 
56 President Bill Clinton’s administration supported a large number of alternatives to 
standard governmental delivery services—thirty-six, in fact—in its “Reinventing 
Government” strategy. See generally Manta 2008; Guttman 2000:861. In terms of 
younger Democrats, Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama in fact partially 
embraces Reaganomics in his book, The Audacity of Hope, see Leonhardt 2008:31, 
adding that “Reagan’s central insight—that the liberal welfare state had grown 
complacent and overly bureaucratic, with Democratic policy makers more obsessed 
with slicing the economic pie than with growing that pie—contained a good deal of 
truth.” Obama 2006.   
57 See The Harris Poll® #94, September 27, 2007 (available at 
http://www.harrisi.org/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=810).   
58 See 20-Nation Poll Finds Strong Global Consensus: Support for Free Market System 
But Also More Regulation of Large Companies (available at 
http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/pipa_market.html).  
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national leaders both on the right and on the left—often in the most 
unexpected places. “The market is the best mechanism ever invented for 
efficiently allocating resources to maximize production,” presidential 
candidate Barack Obama tells the New York Times. Obama adds, “I also 
think that there is a connection between the freedom of the marketplace 
and freedom more generally.”59 Here is an excerpt from another New 
York Times Magazine article, this time on the economist and former 
Harvard University President, Larry Summers, that also recites the 
boilerplate history and the dominant view: “The decades after World 
War II were dominated by the Keynesian notion—shaped in part by one 
of [Summers’] Nobel-Winning uncles, Paul Samuelson—that 
government was good. But the stagflation of the 1970s caused a whole 
generation of economists to look instead toward the market, which 
seemed far more efficient at allocating resources.” 60 Larry Summers 
stands in for this dominant view: “Today Summers says he believes in 
markets as much as ever, and he begins almost any discussion of 
globalization by pointing out its benefits. Food, clothing, furniture and 
dozens of everyday items are more affordable than they once were. 
Interest rates are low, as is inflation, and recessions come less often. 
Bringing down the deficit in the ‘90s, he argues, helped make this 
possible.”61 According to Summers, “I think now the challenge is, again, 
to protect a basic market system based on open trade and globalization, 
to make it one that works for everyone or almost everyone, at a time 
when market forces are often producing outcomes that seem increasingly 
problematic to middle-class families.”62 
 
 Contemporary self-adjusting market mechanisms have 
triumphed, and we are no longer at the mercy of the minute disciplinary 
regimentation characterized by the Parisian police des grains of the mid-
eighteenth century. At least, that’s what we like to tell ourselves.  
 
 
III. 
 
                                                 
59 Leonhardt 2008:32. 
60 Leonhardt 2007:26.  
61 Leonhardt 2007:26.  
62 Leonhardt 2007:26. 
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In the wheat pits at the Chicago Board of Trade, 12:01 P.M., March 20, 
1996, following a period of tight supplies in the wheat market. Loud 
buzzers and Board staff visually signaled the close of the market for the 
March 1996 wheat futures. The closing period—which spanned from 
12:00 P.M. to 12:01 P.M. on March 20th—had just expired. There were 
sixty-one buy order contracts that were still unfilled at the end of the 
closing period, and the last contracts had traded at $5.30 to $5.35 a 
bushel, in line with the morning’s trades. Two traders who held market-
on-close orders, George F. Frey and John C. Bedore, bid up the price 
through closing to approximately $6.00 per bushel, but they were met 
with no responses from other members of the pit.  
 
At 12:02 P.M., one minute past the close, J. Brian Schaer, a local 
in the pit, offered to sell contracts at $7.00, and approximately twelve 
seconds later, at 12:02:12 P.M., sold thirty-one contracts at that price to 
Frey and Bedore—who had been bidding up the price hoping to close 
their open orders. Donald W. Scheck, another local, then offered 
contracts at $7.50, with Brian Schaer matching that offer. In the next half 
a minute, Scheck sold fourteen contracts to a broker Jay P. Ieronimo and 
Schaer sold another sixteen contracts to Frey and Ieronimo, with the final 
trades taking place at 12:02:50 P.M.—one minute and fifty seconds past 
closing.  
 
 Rule 1007.00 of the Chicago Board of Trade provides that the pit 
committee—in this case, the “Wheat Pit Committee” chaired by Jay 
Ieronimo, who had just traded post-closing—could authorize an 
extension of one minute only of the closing period in the case of an 
extraordinary expiration. That never happened,63 but even if it had, it 
would only have extended the trading period to 12:02 P.M., which would 
not have covered the trades contracted after that. A number of Board 
officials, including Chicago Board of Trade chairman, Patrick Arbor, and 
the Exchange Pit Reporter Floor Supervisor, Patrick Sgaraglino, gathered 
to discuss whether any trades after 12:02 P.M. should be honored and 
cleared through the house. They decided the trades would stand because 
of “special circumstances” surrounding the March wheat futures.  
 
                                                 
63 CFTC 1997:*17 n.17. 
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 Ieronimo, in his capacity as chair of the Wheat Pit Committee, 
then began asking around to find out if any of the traders were interested 
in holding a modified closing call—known in the trade as an “MCC” and 
consisting of “a two-minute post-close trading session which may occur 
after the end of a trading session and allows market users to close out 
unliquidated positions. Pit committees schedule MCC sessions only 
when there is an expression of interest. The MCC settlement price, 
which serves as the basis for the trading range during the MCC session, 
is selected by the pit committee.”64 Brian Schaer, who had sold contracts 
past 12:02 P.M., was apparently the only trader who expressed interest in 
an MCC.  
 
Ieronimo decided to hold the MCC.  “A bull horn was used to 
announce that an MCC would be held from 12:14 P.M. to 12:16 P.M. A 
few seconds before the start of the MCC, an Exchange official 
announced that the MCC price range would be $5.30 to $5.32 per 
bushel.”65 Ray Czupek, the floor manager and broker for Louis Dreyfus 
Corporation—which still held a significant long position in March 
wheat—offered contracts at $5.32 per bushel—thus entering the market 
for new business in violation of the Board rule against entering new 
orders during an MCC. Brian Shaer and Donald Scheck, who had both 
sold contracts ranging between $7.00 and $7.50 after the one-minute 
extension to closing, were the only ones to bite. Schaer and Scheck both 
bought contracts sufficient to offset the entire positions that they had just 
created post-closing, and made profits on their trades of, respectively, 
$434,800 and $152,600. There were no other trades made during the 
MCC. Others involved in the earlier trading saw large losses, some as 
high as $300,000. 
  
 The Office of Investigations and Audits of the Chicago Board of 
Trade conducted a quick review of the March futures expiration, and 
about a month later the Business Conduct Committee of the Board issued 
charges against Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey, Bedore, and Czupek, as 
well as Dreyfus and two other firms. They were charged with violations 
of Chicago Board Rules 1007.00, 350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02, 
proscribing after-hours trading, MCC conventions, and hedging rules. 
                                                 
64 CFTC 1997:*9 n.10. 
65 CFTC 1997:*9. 
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Board Rules 1007.00 and 1007.02, for instance, set forth the following 
restrictions on trading: 
 
On the last day of trading in an expiring future, a bell shall 
be rung at 12 o’clock noon designating the beginning of the 
close of the expiring future. Trading shall be permitted 
thereafter for a period not to exceed one minute and 
quotations made during this time period shall constitute the 
close. When in the opinion of the relevant Pit Committee 
extraordinary conditions prevail any such one minute period 
may be extended to two minutes by special authorization of 
the relevant Pit Committee… 
 
Immediately following the prescribed closing procedure for 
all contracts, there shall be a two (2) minute trading period 
(the “modified closing call”). All trades which may occur 
during regularly prescribed trading hours may occur during 
the call at prices within the lesser of the actual closing range 
or a range of three (3) official trading increments, i.e., one 
(1) increment above and below the settlement price, or at 
prices within the lesser of the actual closing range or a range 
of nine (9) official trading increments, i.e., four (4) 
increments above and below the settlement price, as the 
Regulatory Compliance Committee shall prescribe; (ii) no 
new orders may be entered into the call; (iii) cancellations 
may be entered into the call; (iv) stop, limit and other resting 
orders elected by prices during the close may be executed 
during the call; and (v) individual members may trade as a 
principal and/or agent during the call. In accordance with the 
determination of the Regulatory Compliance Committee, 
CBOT contracts shall be traded during the Modified Closing 
Call as follows: Lesser of actual closing range or nine 
trading increments [for] Wheat Futures and Options.66 
 
 
 During the summer of 1996, the Board entered into settlement 
negotiations with Schaer, Scheck, and the other individuals and firms, 
                                                 
66 CFTC 1997:*12-13, n.13 and 14. 
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and resolved the charges by way primarily of written reprimand. 
Settlements were reached with Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey and 
Bedore by issuing letters of reprimand against each of them, and with 
Dreyfus Corporation by means of an admission of wrongdoing and a 
$10,000 fine.   
 
The Divisions of Enforcement and Trading & Markets of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, however, recommended that 
the Commission review the six settlements because they did not believe 
that the written sanctions were “commensurate with the gravity of the 
alleged violation and otherwise failed to conform to Commission 
guidance on sanctions.”67 In light of the Commission’s decision to 
review, the Chicago Board of Trade conducted additional investigations 
and interviewed 38 persons, had the interviews transcribed and then 
reviewed by the staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
which oversees the Board; the Board prepared follow-up questions for 19 
persons at the request of the Commission staff, and resubmitted the 
second round of interviews to the Commission. The Board also 
submitted documentary evidence of trading cards, order tickets, and 
other reports.  
 
The Commission conducted additional investigation of its own, 
reviewing—in addition to the Board documents, the record of the 
disciplinary proceedings, and written argument by the parties—
“observations of Commission floor surveillance staff during the 
expiration” and “information independently obtained by the Commission 
staff.”68 The latter included “interviews with commercial participants, 
market analyses, trading profiles of the two locals [Shaer and Scheck] 
involved in the expiration, a trade practice investigation, review of data 
to determine compliance with speculative position limits, and a review of 
the ‘gap’ function in the CBOT’s price reporting system.”69  
 
The Commission set aside the sanctions and remanded the cases 
back to the Board of Trade because the penalties had not been severe 
enough. “In order to protect the integrity of the markets, the exchanges 
must vigorously enforce their rules concerning trading hours and impose 
                                                 
67 CFTC 1997:*1. 
68 CFTC 1997:*3. 
69 CFTC 1997:*4 n.2. 
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meaningful sanctions in disciplinary proceedings alleging trading after 
the close,” three Commissioners declared. “We believe that imposing 
reprimands for misconduct as serious as that alleged here, even in the 
context of settled proceedings, reflects an apparent unwillingness on the 
part of the CBOT to enforce its rules in the manner necessary to ensure 
an effective self-regulatory disciplinary program.”70 
 
The notion of “self-regulation” is critical in the commission’s 
written opinion. The very term “self-regulatory” is used seven times in 
the main text, another five times in the margin and twice in the 
dissenting opinion: strict sanctions are “necessary to ensure an effective 
self-regulatory disciplinary program,”71 reflect the Board’s “critical self-
regulatory responsibilities,”72 and whether the Board “adequately 
fulfilled its self-regulatory responsibilities,”73 indicate “the seriousness 
with which the self-regulatory organization views its rules,”74 and are 
crucial for such “self-regulatory organizations.”75 In this case, the 
Commission concludes, “the sanctions chosen by the CBOT are 
inadequate in light of … their reflection of an apparent failure in the self-
regulatory system.”76 “In exercising their self-regulatory 
responsibilities,” the Commission emphasizes, “exchanges should take 
vigorous action against those who engage in activities which violate their 
rules…”77 In conclusion, the Commission notes, “The CBOT’s approach 
in these cases could seriously undermine its ability to operate effectively 
as a self-regulatory organization.”78 
  
The Commission justifies their concern with the following: 
 
[A]ny disregard of established trading hours should be viewed as 
a significant violation. Rules governing the time, place, and 
manner of trading help to ensure a fair and open market. No one 
of these requirements is less important than the others, and 
                                                 
70 CFTC 1997:*2. 
71 Id. at *3. 
72 Id. at *4 n.3. 
73 Id. at *40. 
74 Id. at *51. 
75 Id. at *17 n.19 and *43 n.34. 
76 Id. at *40. 
77 Id. at *41. 
78 Id. at *52. 
 
 
 
23 Bernard E. Harcourt 
 
noncompliance with any one of them may be as damaging to the 
market as noncompliance with all of them. Even when done in 
the pit by “open outcry,” post-close trading threatens an open and 
competitive market because a large segment of the market—those 
who obey the rules governing trading hours—are excluded from 
participating.  As former Commission Chairman Philip Johnson 
has observed, the rationale for prohibiting trading other than 
during official trading hours is that “true competition is only 
present in the marketplace during normal hours of trading.” The 
absence of “true competition” calls into question the price 
discovery role of the exchange and could result in loss of 
confidence in CBOT prices. As we recently stated, “open and 
competitive execution is the bedrock underlying public 
confidence in the objectivity and fairness of futures trading.”79 
 
Trading-hour infractions are extremely significant, the Commission 
emphasized. In fact, “Congress has determined that activities like [these] 
are malum in se, and it is our duty to assure that this legislative 
determination is effectuated.”80 
 
The United States Attorney’s Office in Chicago began 
investigating trading-hour infractions on the Chicago Board of Trade. In 
order to preempt further federal intervention, the Board revised its rules 
regarding the possible extension of the closing period. “Most notably, the 
CBOT deleted the provision under which the close of an expiring 
contract could be extended from one minute to two minutes, thus 
eliminating potential confusion among floor members about the 
appropriate duration for a close in an expiring contract. The CBOT also 
now precludes the pit reporters from accepting price quotations more 
than 30 seconds after the close for futures in order to assure that trading 
is halted on time.”81 
 
 
IV. 
 
                                                 
79 CFTC 1997:48-49. 
80 CFTC 1997:*50 n.45. 
81 CFTC 1997:*54. 
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More than two centuries separate the police des grains and these 
enforcement proceedings at the Chicago Board of Trade. The two 
periods bear important similarities and differences. Yet our perception of 
the two could not be more radically divergent. The Paris markets of the 
mid-eighteenth century represent to us today the epitome of excess 
regulation—of government intervention gone awry, of authoritarian 
control of the economy. In contrast, the Chicago Board of Trade reflects, 
to our modern eyes, the epitome of the free market in the western world, 
the pinnacle of free trade, the zenith of late-modern capitalism. Simply 
put, the Chicago Board of Trade is the free market. When we look at the 
Chicago Board or the New York Stock Exchange, we do not see the 
intricate web of regulations regarding closing periods and trading hours, 
access, surveillance, and computer monitoring. We do not see Chicago 
Board Rules 1007.00, 350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02, proscribing after-
hours trading, MCC conventions, and hedging rules. We see the free 
market at work. How did that come about? 
 
At both times, the market was the exclusive venue in which to 
exchange the desired commodities and the markets were highly 
administered. Who, when, where, how—the hours of opening and 
closing, the identity of the merchants, traders, and buyers, the means of 
delivery, controls on variations in pricing—all aspects of trading on the 
markets were regulated. Our contemporary markets—whether the 
Chicago Board of Trade, the New York Mercantile Exchange, the New 
York Stock Exchange, or any of the other exchanges—are shot through 
with layers of overlapping governmental supervision, of exchange rules 
and regulations, of federal and state criminal investigations, and of 
exchange self-policing and self-regulatory mechanisms—as evident in 
the case of Schaer and Scheck. Our contemporary markets, like the 
Parisian markets of the eighteenth century, are policed.  
 
Naturally, there are also marked differences. No police prefect or 
procureur fiscal sets the right price of a loaf of bread or a stack of wheat 
today—the prix commun du marché—although the commission for 
trading the goods may be fixed and, of course, the most important 
commodity of all—money—is set by the central bank both in the United 
States and in the European Union. No huissard patrols the exchange 
floor conducting inspections and ferreting out fraud or deception today—
although computer algorithms, federal investigators, and the exchanges 
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themselves monitor each and every trade to detect suspicious activity, 
often on “a customer-by-customer basis.”82 Contemporary enforcement 
proceedings are more likely to involve self-regulatory mechanisms—
self-monitoring by the exchange itself, a chartered corporation not 
formally part of the state—though the earlier markets were also heavily 
self-policed under a guild system that functioned by means of elected 
syndics who policed and monitored the commercial activities of guild 
members.  
 
There are indeed important similarities and significant 
differences. As a practical matter, it would be extraordinarily difficult, if 
not infeasible to determine with exactitude whether the differences—
with all their related technological transformations and 
metamorphoses—outweigh the similarities. It is impossible to quantify 
the uniform and gaze of the huissard and measure it against the 
electronic impulse that reads every single stock trade on a high volume 
alert. It is impracticable to weigh the impact of prohibiting la vente par 
échantillons—the sale by samples—against the effect of shutting down a 
thriving secondary market in mutual fund shares. “Royal ordinances first 
specified a ‘circle of prohibition’ around Paris having a radius of eight 
lieues (leagues). Inside this circle, any purchase of grain by bakers or 
traders, whether at market or in the growers’ storehouse, was 
forbidden”83: how do we measure the effect of this ordonnance and 
weigh it against the fixed delivery locations and the limited space for 
warehousing wheat in Chicago? How do we weigh the requirement that 
all grain be sold at the Paris markets against the contemporary 
requirement that all grain futures be traded at the Chicago Board of 
Trade? 
 
These questions have no answer, and yet we continue to perceive 
the two periods as radically different. How did it come about, exactly, 
that we would perceive the first economic regime—the Paris markets 
circa 1750—as governed by, to borrow Adam Smith’s words, “such 
absurd regulations” and yet view the second regime, the Chicago Board 
of Trade of today, as “free”? What has shaped our perception so, that we 
                                                 
82 Friedman 2002:798. 
83 Afanassiev 1894 :73. 
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would label one “regulated” and the other “free”? How did that come 
about? And at what price?  
 
 
V. 
 
First, how did we come to see the Parisian police des grains as the 
epitome of disciplinary regulation and the Chicago Board of Trade as the 
bastion of freedom? The answer, I believe, turns on the emergence in the 
eighteenth century of the idea of natural order—the notion of an 
economic system that is autonomous and achieves equilibrium without 
government intervention—and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea, 
over the course of the twentieth century, into the concept of market 
efficiency. It is the idea of natural order that renders coherent and makes 
possible the belief in self-adjusting and self-sustaining markets. The idea 
of self-stabilizing internal flows that function best when left alone—this 
conceptualization of natural orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of 
natural harmony in the economic realm, is what allowed eighteenth 
century thinkers to reimagine social reality, and it is what facilitates the 
understanding we have today. The idea of natural order also made 
possible the shift in semiotic meaning of the police des grains—from a 
policy viewed as necessary and freedom-enhancing to a policy viewed as 
oppressive and misguided. In addition, it also helped displace an earlier 
belief that all men naturally tend toward criminal deviance, one that 
remains strong today only in the penal domain.  
 
The emergence and triumph of the idea of natural order was 
influenced greatly by François Quesnay, the Marquis de Mirabeau, 
Dupont de Nemours, Le Mercier de la Rivière and other early French 
economists during the period 1756 to 1767. François Quesnay, a highly 
accomplished physician at Versailles, the first doctor to Mme. De 
Pompadour and first ordinary to Louis XV, and a prolific writer in the 
medical field, turned his attention to economics in 1756 and founded an 
intellectual circle that became known as “les économistes” or “les 
Physiocrates.” Quesnay and his disciples promoted the idea of an “ordre 
naturel” in the field of political economy. Their writings were highly 
influential both in France and abroad, and it is precisely their notion of 
natural order that metamorphosed, over time, into the modern economic 
notion of market efficiency that is at the heart of neoliberal thought. The 
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Physiocrats’ idea of an “ordre naturel” helped make it possible for us 
today to believe that the Parisian markets were overregulated and that 
our contemporary markets are free. It is this notion that has shaped the 
way we see the world. 
 
 Of Public Economy and Police 
 
But it was not always so. Although today we tend to characterize 
the regulation of Parisien markets as excessively disciplinary and 
repressive, there was an earlier time when these same regulations formed 
part of a more coherent understanding that fell under an earlier rubric of 
“police” and that formed an integral part of the field of public economy. 
One central task of public economy, in the eyes of its earliest exponents, 
was precisely to ensure the abundance and cheapness of food and 
consumable goods at market—what was called, at the time, providing for 
“bon marché.”  
 
The younger Adam Smith understood this well and in fact used 
the discourse of bon marché in his lectures on moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence in the early 1760s. It was precisely under the rubric of 
“police” that Smith lectured on public economy, on the regulation of 
markets, on monopolies, money, and trade: on how best to regulate 
agricultural production and manufacturing; on how to encourage the 
division of labor; on what to do with foreign trade; on how to manage 
currency, banking and interest rates—in sum, on how to render the state 
more opulent, on how to increase the wealth of a nation, or, which was 
the same thing for Smith, on how to enable citizens to obtain needed and 
desired food, clothes, and lodging—to satisfy the necessities of life.84 
Smith placed his entire discussion of public economy under the rubric of 
“police” and he identified the principal task of “police” as facilitating 
bon marché. 
 
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, which he delivered at Glasgow 
University during the period 1762 to 1764—after the publication of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 but before the Wealth of Nations in 
1776—the young Adam Smith used—and used exclusively—the rubric 
                                                 
84 Smith viewed luxuries as a waste of resources, as he did hoarding or saving, which he 
perceived as removing currency and wealth from the circulation and therefore viewed 
as decreasing the opulence of the state. 
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of “police” to discuss public economy. Once the internal security of a 
nation was ensured and subjects could benefit from their private 
property, Smith reportedly lectured in 1762-63, the state’s attention 
should turn to the task of promoting the state’s wealth. “This produces 
what we call police,” Smith said. “Whatever regulations are made with 
respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country 
are considered as belonging to the police.”85 
 
The young Smith traced the notion of police to French 
administration, citing the folklore that the king of France demanded three 
services from his lieutenant général de police—namely, that he assure 
the cleanliness and security of the nation and the abundance and 
cheapness of goods at market. Smith referred specifically to the famous 
lieutenant de police, Marc René de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis 
d’Argenson, chief of police in Paris from 1697 to 1718, and to the story 
that, upon acceding to the post, d’Argenson was told that the king of 
France expected him to take care of three things: “1st, the clean<n>ess or 
neteté; 2nd, the aisance, ease or security; and 3rd, bon marché or 
cheapness of provisions.”86 Smith lectured that the goal of police is “the 
means proper to produce opulence,”87 and that “the objects of Police are 
the cheapness of commodities, public security, and cleanliness.” 88 Under 
the heading of police, Smith stated in his 1763-64 lectures, “we will 
consider the opulence of a state,”89 or, more specifically, “the 
consideration of cheapness or plenty, or, which is the same thing, the 
most proper way of procuring wealth and abundance.”90  
 
To the early public economists, including the young Smith, 
“police” was what ensured the abundant provision of necessary foods 
and commodities. As Michel Foucault, Pasquale Pasquino, and others 
                                                 
85 Smith 1978:5 [i.1-2]. 
86 Smith 1978:5 [i.2]; see also 331 [vi.2] [“he was to provide for the neteté, surete, and 
bon marché in the city”]. Smith had in his library Bielfield’s Institutions politiques, 
which quotes the chief of police in Paris in 1697: “Le Roi, Monsieur, vous demande 
sûreté, netteté, bon-marché. En effet ces trois articles comprennent toute la police, qui 
forme le troisième grand objet de la politique pour l'intérieur de l'Etat” (see generally 
Cannan 1976 : xxv-xxvi). 
87 Smith 1978:333 [vi.8]. 
88 Smith 1978:398 [5]. 
89 Smith 1978:398 [5]. 
90 Smith 1978:487 [205]. 
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have shown, this early notion of “police” conveyed a number of 
meanings—not just the enforcement function associated with the 
lieutenant général de la police that, at least in some respects, resembles 
more closely our contemporary understanding of law enforcement, blue 
uniforms, and order maintenance.91 The term “police” also captured, in 
broader terms, what we could call today “administration,” but 
administration limited to the subdivisions of the state; the term 
gouvernement or governing, in contrast, covered the administration of 
l’Etat or the state.92 But the different meanings were imbricated: the 
administration of subsistence and markets fell under the jurisdiction of 
policing functions and were perceived as calling for surveillance. As the 
early Smith lectures demonstrate, public economy and “police” were 
continuous. 
 
Among the champions of the police des grains—for instance, 
commissioner Nicolas Delamare,93 author of the Traité de la police—the 
policing of markets reduced the price of bread and ensured bon marché. 
Delamare had seen famine and food shortages close up, he explained. A 
hands-off approach was the ideal, he suggested, but some oversight and 
administration was necessary especially in times of scarcity. True liberty 
required government organization. In order to achieve cheapness and 
plenty—the central goal of public economy—it was necessary to 
calibrate the market. On this earlier view, policing and economic welfare 
were one.  
 
It would take but a small step to extend this logic directly to the 
field of crime and punishment. The young Milanese aristocrat, Cesare 
Beccaria, would do just this in his concise yet seminal tract, Dei delitti e 
delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments)—published anonymously in 
1764. The new field of public economy, Beccaria boasted, had tamed 
and civilized nations through commerce. “We have discovered the true 
relations between sovereign and subjects,” Beccaria declared, “and there 
is waged among nations a silent war by trade, which is the most humane 
                                                 
91 Foucault STP 2004:320-322; Pasquino 1991:109-116; Kaplan 1976:Vol.I:11-14; 
Napoli 2003:8; Dubber and Valverde 2006:1-2. For an excellent early treatment of this 
issue, see Olivier-Martin 1988 [1945]:13-22.  
92 Olivier-Martin 1988 [1945]:13. 
93 Nicolas Delamare signed his name in one word and so I will use that form (Olivier-
Martin 1988:8).  
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sort of war and more worthy of reasonable men.”94 The same lessons, 
Beccaria believed, could tame and civilize our punishment practices, 
and, in the process, eliminate the brutal excesses of seventeenth century 
penality. Under Beccaria’s influence, the field of public economy would 
colonize the penal domain and impose the same logic of measured and 
proportional responses to the same problem of man’s natural tendency 
toward deviance. In Beccaria’s eyes, men behave the same way in 
economic and in social exchange: they privilege their own self-interest 
and always tend to break the rules. In the penal sphere—just as in the 
economic domain—the solution Beccaria proposed was to properly 
administer a rational framework of tariffs and prices. For Beccaria, 
“police” was an integral part of public economy. As a result, Beccaria’s 
lectures in public economy delivered in Milan in 1769—the notes of 
which were published posthumously as his Elementi or Elements of 
Public Economy—covered five areas: agriculture, arts and 
manufacturing, commerce, finance, and police. “Of Police” constituted 
an integral part of the study of public economy—an entire section 
alongside commerce and finance—because it shared the same rationality, 
namely that of public administration.  
 
 The common thread in the young Adam Smith and in Beccaria is 
the continuity between “police” administration and economics. For both, 
the two spheres were completely overlapping. To Smith, the umbrella 
category is “police,” and that category subsumes the discussion of public 
economy and the wealth of a nation. To Beccaria—and other cameralists 
of his time—the overarching category is public economy, within which 
“police” forms one important sector alongside commerce and finance. In 
both, though, the two domains are seamless and continuous. The two 
fields overlap and overlay. There is no alterity between them.   
 
 Of Physiocrats, Natural Order, and Market Efficiency 
 
It is precisely this vision of a seamless relation between the field 
of public economy and the realm of “police” that gives way in the 
second half of the eighteenth century to a far different ideal. If cheapness 
and plenty, if bon marché was the goal of public economy and of the 
police des grains at mid-century, things could hardly have been more 
                                                 
94 Beccaria 1995:8. 
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different only a decade later. The contrast is striking and captured by the 
new dogma of François Quesnay:  
 
Abondance et non-valeur n’est pas richesse. 
Disette et cherté est misère.  
Abondance et cherté est opulence.95  
 
In other words, abundance and plenty do not translate into the wealth of 
a nation. Scarcity and high prices, of course, are misery. It is abundance 
and high prices that produces opulence. 
 
This shift would radically transform the meaning, the 
connotation, and the role of policing—and it would do so first in the 
writings of the earliest économistes. From François Quesnay’s first 
published contribution to the field of political economy, his encyclopedia 
entry on Fermiers (Farmers) in Tome VI of the Encyclopédie in 1756, to 
his final contributions to economics collected and published in Du Pont 
de Nemours’ Physiocratie in 1768, Quesnay would fundamentally 
reorient the relationship between public economy and “police”: 
governmental intervention in the markets would become oppressive and 
interfere with the autonomous functioning of an economic system 
governed by natural laws and natural order. By 1776, the year The 
Wealth of Nations was published, Adam Smith would no longer use the 
rubric “police” to discuss public economy. In fact, the word “police” 
only appear once in the entire text of The Wealth of Nations.  
 
A new way of thinking had taken hold, one based on the idea of 
natural order. Natural order reigned in the economic domain—in 
agriculture and commerce—and thereby obviated the need for “police.” 
The sphere of public economy came to be viewed as an autonomous, 
self-adjusting system regulated by natural laws that, if left alone, 
produced a net product.96 The only way for the state to participate in the 
                                                 
95 Quesnay 2005: 570. 
96 “Net product” is defined as “a disposable surplus over necessary cost. Anything 
which increased this net product would cause an expansion in economic activity, and 
anything which reduced it would cause a contraction in economic activity.” (Meek 
1962:19). Or as Dupont explains: “Il appella produit net cette portion des récoltes qui 
excède le remboursement des fraix de culture, et l’intérêt des avances qu’elle exige » 
(Dupont 1808 :313). Meek explains that the political implications for Quesnay all 
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wealth of the nation was not to administer and police, but instead to pull 
out of the sphere of agricultural production and stop intervening in 
commerce and trade. The police function was severed from the economic 
domain and relegated to the margin. 
 
François Quesnay presented the idea of natural order to his 
contemporaries in his Tableau économique, first published in an 
augmented volume of the Marquis de Mirabeau’s L’Ami des hommes in 
1760. The Tableau was a graphic depiction of cash and commodity flows 
between the three principle classes of society—the cultivators, the 
property-owners, and the manufacturers. By means of a simple graph and 
its zig-zag lines, Quesnay sought to visualize his main theses, namely 
that agricultural production is the sole source of all societal wealth, that 
wealth can only be produced by means of an autonomous system of 
exchange, and therefore that the state must cease intervening with tariffs, 
restrictions on the flow of trade, and other regulations. Quesnay’s 
Tableau économique received a lot of attention because it attempted to 
graphically and systematically represent an economic system—what 
Louis Dumont refers to as “an ordered whole.”97 This is precisely what 
Marx found so brilliant. Marx wrote of Quesnay’s Tableau, in his 
Theories of Surplus Value, that “this attempt to represent the whole in 
one table that is composed in fact of only five lines, connecting six 
points of departure to their endpoints, in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, at the infancy of public economy, was a stroke of genius, 
without a doubt the most brilliant in the history of public economy.”98 
But what was even more important and influential on future liberal 
thought was not simply the notion of an economic system, it was rather 
the idea of natural order. Systems can function well with external 
                                                                                                                       
derive from his economic idea of increasing the “net product”: “The strategic variable, 
then, is the magnitude of the net product, and it is to the problem of increasing the net 
product that the government’s policy should be primarily directed. Since the magnitude 
of the net product depends largely upon the aggregate output of corn and upon the price 
of corn, it follows that the government must take all possible measures to increase the 
first while at the same time increasing or at least maintaining the second. The 
encouragement of investment in agriculture and the stimulation of demand for 
agricultural produce must therefore be the main aims of government policy. Most of the 
specific policy measures advocated by the Physiocrats will be found upon investigation 
to fit into this simple pattern.” (Meek 1962:22).  
97 Dumont 1977:41. 
98 Marx 1974:399. 
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calibration and intervention: an engine may function as a perfect whole 
so long as one adds fuel. What was remarkable about Quesnay’s Tableau 
is that his system was governed by natural order and was entirely 
autonomous of external inputs. What Quesnay really contributed was not 
just the idea of a system, but that of natural orderliness—an idea that 
would eventually receive its most elaborate articulation in Le Mercier de 
la Rivière’s 1767 book, L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés 
politiques.  
 
To be sure, the idea of natural order was not entirely new. The 
Physiocrats were not the first to draw on or elaborate the concept. 
Simone Meyssonnier, in her history of the origins of French liberal 
thought in the XVIIIth century, La Balance et l’Horloge (1989), traces 
the idea back to Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert who wrote almost a 
hundred years earlier in the period 1695 to 1707. Joseph Schumpeter 
famously traced the notion back to the Scholastics—the theologians of 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.99 Schumpeter places Quesnay 
firmly among the “philosophers of natural law” influenced by Aquinas 
and the medieval natural order theorists.100 And Du Pont de Nemours 
himself—the chief publicist and greatest admirer and disciple of 
Quesnay—traced the Physiocratic doctrine to, among others, the Marquis 
d’Argenson, who is credited with the maxim “Pas trop gouverner.”101   
 
But true originality is not the sole source of influence. Quesnay’s 
obsession with natural order was perceived as new—which is often what 
matters more. As new and radical. Many believed that it inaugurated, in 
the words of Dupont de Nemours, “a new science in Europe,”102 and 
many championed Quesnay as the founding father of that new science. 
                                                 
99 Schumpeter 1968:97. 
100 Schumpeter 1968: 223-243; see generally Beer 1939. 
101 In a “Notice” entitled Sur les économistes, which he published in preface to Turgot’s 
éloge to M. de Gournay in his edition of the complete oeuvres of Turgot, Dupont traces 
Physiocratic thought—the thought of “Les Économistes français, fondateurs de la 
science modern de l’économie politique” (Dupont 1808:309)—to three sources or 
precursors. The first is the duc de Sully who privileged agriculture. It is he who said 
that “le labourage et le pasturage sont les mamelles de l’Etat” (Dupont 1808:309). The 
second is d’Argenson, discussed in text. The third is Mr. Trudaine le père, who also 
toiled in these fields (Dupont 1808:309; see also Du Pont’s Notice sur les Économistes 
reproduced in Turgot 1844 vol. I:258). 
102 Rothschild 2004:4. 
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As Emma Rothschild suggests, “In an epoch of almost obsessive 
preoccupation with newness—new sciences, new systems of trade, new 
music, objects wholly new in the world—the revolution in economic 
thought was genuinely innovative. Quesnay and his followers conceived 
of national economies, for the first time, as vast systems of 
interdependent flows; Turgot described them as constituted by the 
interconnected transactions of millions of individual agents. All 
individuals, the poor as well as the rich, the agricultural labourers as well 
as the great merchants, were identified as part of a single economic 
system.”103  
 
The birth or, perhaps to be fair, the emergence and maturation of 
the idea of natural order helped shape a vision of the economic sphere as 
an autonomous, self-adjusting, and self-regulated system that could 
achieve a natural equilibrium spontaneously and produce increased 
wealth. No doubt, material shifts in technology, in agricultural and 
industrial production, and larger changes in demographics and 
international relations, played important roles in the perceptual change. 
But what made the notion of a “free market” comprehensible, coherent, 
and convincing was precisely the idea of natural order. It is an idea that 
fundamentally altered the discourse and the dominant way of reasoning 
and rationalizing the world. It radically altered the way that 
contemporaries understood their social surroundings and the relationship 
between public economy and “police.”  
 
 The same notion resurfaces in the work of Adam Smith and 
Jeremy Bentham, and, today, in the work of contemporary neoliberal 
thinkers, such as Richard Posner or Richard Epstein. The idea of natural 
order has metamorphosed today into the belief in the efficiency of the 
market. It is natural order that makes possible Richard Posner’s belief 
that “When transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by 
definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources.”104 In fact, 
natural efficiency is so central to Richard Posner’s thought that he 
defines criminal behavior in terms of efficiency: criminal behavior is 
human behavior that is inefficient. As Posner explains, “I argue that what 
is forbidden is a class of inefficient acts.”105 The very definition of crime 
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104 Posner 1985:1195-1196. 
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turns on the notion of natural efficiency. In the very same way, the 
Physiocrats would define criminality as disorder and deviance from 
natural laws—as we will see shortly.  
 
Today’s neoliberal thought traces back to this severing of 
“police” and public economy. This discourse and way of reasoning has 
colonized our perception both of the Parisian markets of the eighteenth 
century and of our existing markets and exchanges. It is what allows us 
to believe, despite the mounting evidence to the contrary—despite the 
bailouts of Bear Stearns or Fannie Mae or A.I.G.—that our current 
market mechanisms are in fact self-adjusting and self-regulating, and 
achieve stability without administration.  
 
 
VI. 
 
The next question is, then, at what price? At what price have we come 
to believe that the economy is the realm of natural order and that the 
legitimate sphere of policing—of administration and government—lies 
elsewhere? At the price, first, of significantly distorting and expanding 
without limit the penal sphere, and, second, of naturalizing and hiding 
the regulatory mechanisms in our contemporary markets, and thereby 
masking the enormous wealth redistributions that occur daily.  
 
First, the distortion of the penal sphere. The birth of natural order 
in the writings of the Physiocrats led seamlessly to the expansion of the 
penal sphere as the only legitimate space for governmental 
administration and intervention. The idea of orderliness matured into a 
political theory that combined laissez faire in commercial matters with 
centralized, authoritarian policing elsewhere—what the Physiocrats 
referred to as the doctrine of “legal despotism.” Under the rubric “legal 
despotism,” François Quesnay and Mercier de la Rivière formulated a 
political ideal of complete governmental inactivity in all but the penal 
sphere. Given the existence of natural laws governing commerce, the 
économistes envisaged no role for the legislature except to criminalize 
and punish severely those who deviate from the natural order.  
 
 Natural order in the universe implied legal despotism in human 
affairs. The Physiocrats embraced this doctrine in 1767 with the 
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publication that same year of both Quesnay’s essay, Despotisme de la 
Chine and Le Mercier’s book, L’Ordre essentiel et naturel. Their 
economic writings led them, in a syllogistic manner, to the conclusion 
that natural order in an autonomous economic sphere demands both that 
there be no human intervention (in terms of positive law) in the 
economic realm and that positive law limit itself to punishing deviance 
from the natural order, in other words theft and violence. The logic 
proceeded as follows: 
 
1. The economic, agricultural, and commercial realm is 
governed by fundamental natural laws that best promote the 
interests of mankind. 
 
2. As a result, positive human-made laws could do no more than 
merely instantiate the fundamental natural laws. At best, 
positive law would simply mirror the natural order; any 
deviation would produce disorder rather than order. 
 
3. Therefore, positive law should not extend to the domain of 
natural laws, or, as Quesnay stated, “Positive legislation 
should therefore not reach the domain of physical laws.”106 
 
4. For this reason there is no need for a separate legislature. All 
law-making power should be centralized in a unified 
executive—a legal despot—who learns and implements the 
laws of nature. 
 
5. It is only those men whose passions are out-of-adjustment 
with natural order—those whose passions are “déréglées,”107 
as Quesnay wrote—who fail to see and appreciate the 
fundamental laws of natural. 
 
6. The only object of positive man-made laws, then, should be 
to severely punish those whose passions are out-of-order, as a 
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domaine des loix phisiques »). 
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way to protect society from these thieves and derelicts—“des 
voleurs et des méchans,” as Quesnay would say.108  
 
The notion of natural order does all the work in this logical 
argument, and it leads inexorably to a penal sphere that is, on the one 
hand, marginalized, but on the other hand unleashed and allowed to 
expand without any limitation. Since some men’s passions are out-of-
order and these men cannot appreciate the natural order, the legal despot 
has full and unlimited discretion to repress and punish. Man-made, 
positive law serves only one legitimate function: to punish those who 
violate the natural order.  
 
Notice that the penal sphere, on this view, is portrayed as 
exceptional. It is the only domain where natural order does not 
autonomously produce the best result for mankind. It is the only place 
where order does not reign. It is entirely other, in this sense. It is the 
space outside the dominant realm of natural orderliness, the extremity 
where one finds, in Quesnay’s words, the passions déréglées and the 
hommes pervers.109 The contrast with Beccaria and other cameralists 
could not be more pronounced: their seamless web of public economy 
and “police” gives way to a sharp distinction between a realm of 
economic order, where laissez faire must govern, and a realm for 
positive laws and penal sanctions, where the government must and may 
only legitimately intervene. The Physiocrats invent natural order in the 
economic domain but in the process, establish the penal sphere as the 
outer limit of the system, as the only legitimate realm for administration 
and repression, as the zone of policing. 
 
Notice also that this view segments an earlier, more unified 
conception of man’s natural tendency to deviate from the rules of 
society. In Beccaria’s writings, there was a conception of the self-
interested individual who tended to deviate and commit crimes in all 
aspects of life, especially in commerce. Beccaria sought to formalize the 
relationship of deviance by discovering mathematical relations between 
gain and self-interest. His underlying assumption, though, was that all 
merchants will deviate—and their self-interested deviations do not 
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necessarily serve the public good. This was also not a story of private 
vices, public virtues. In contrast, here, only those who are déréglés have 
a natural tendency toward unproductive deviance. The pursuit of self-
interest is no longer viewed as a criminal tendency.    
 
This new penal paradigm significantly influenced nineteenth 
century liberal and modern neoliberal thought. Although Adam Smith 
and Jeremy Bentham would reject Physiocratic thought—primarily 
because of Quesnay’s devotion to agriculture as the sole means of 
creating national wealth—both Smith and Bentham embraced and 
developed a notion of natural order in their economic writings and 
reproduced—by the odd conjunction of liberal economic theory and 
Beccarian punishment theory—the same relationship between markets 
and punishment: natural order in the economic sphere but government 
intervention in the penal sphere.  
 
 This is most evident in Jeremy Bentham’s work. On the public 
economy side, Bentham embraced Adam Smith’s liberalism. In his 
Manual of Political Economy written in 1793-95, Bentham rehearses the 
liberal doctrines of self-interest and social welfare—of private vices and 
public virtues: self-interest in the economic context, rather than leading 
to disorder and crime, promotes the greatest economic advantage for all. 
Because human wisdom is tied to self-interest, governmental 
interference, Bentham suggested, could only result in less wealth being 
created.110 And to help explain this, Bentham appeals to nature: “Nature 
gives a premium for the application of industry to the most advantageous 
branch, a premium which is sure to be disposed of to the best 
advantage.”111 Bentham completes the argument suggesting that, not 
only will giving individuals the greatest freedom to pursue their own 
self-interest result in the greatest advantage for themselves, but it will 
also produce the greatest happiness and advantage for society as a 
whole.112 In his public economy, Bentham favored Smith’s liberalism.  
 
On the punishment side, however, Bentham embraced Beccaria 
whole cloth. In all matters penal, Bentham aligned himself with 
Beccaria’s notion of policing and administration—of a sphere of human 
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activity that must be shot through with government intervention. In fact, 
the criminal code, for Bentham, was precisely a “grand catalogue of 
prices” by means of which the government set the price of deviance. The 
penal code was a menu of fixed prices, the exact opposite of laissez 
faire.  
 
Beccaria’s influence on Bentham was formative. Beccaria’s small 
tract, On Crimes and Punishments, had been translated into English in 
1767—at which point Bentham would have been 19 years old. Bentham 
wrote the main manuscript of his first work on the same topic, Rationale 
for Punishment, in 1775 when he was, in H.L.A. Hart’s words, “fresh 
from the study of Beccaria’s already famous book.”113 Bentham agreed 
with Beccaria on all major aspects of his theory of punishment: they both 
viewed deviance and rule-breaking in this domain as natural and 
universal—as the basic condition of man; they both critiqued the 
brutalizing effect of excessive punishment and endorsed marginal 
deterrence as a limiting principle on punishment; they both favored 
speedy and certain punishments as a way to reinforce the associations of 
punishment with crime; and more generally they both agreed on the need 
for formal law and “legality” as giving legitimacy to the criminal justice 
system and the sovereign.  Naturally, Bentham did have some 
reservations about Beccaria;114 but on the whole, those pale in 
comparison to the debt Bentham properly acknowledged. In fact, 
Bentham took pains to express how much Beccaria had contributed to 
his own intellectual development. Speaking of Beccaria, Bentham 
exclaimed:   
 
Oh my master, first evangelist of Reason, you who have raised 
your Italy so far above England. . . [Y]ou who have made so 
many useful excursions into the path of utility, what is there left 
for us to do? —Never to turn aside from that path.115  
 
But in Bentham’s work, the relationship between political 
economy and the criminal sanction had radically changed. The penal 
sphere had been pushed outside political economy and served the 
function of a police barricade: the bulk of economic exchange was 
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viewed as orderly, voluntary, and tending toward the common good; 
only in the case of deviance did the state step in, using the mechanisms 
of punishment to regulate human conduct. The penal sanction was 
marked off from the dominant logic of economics as the only space 
where those older notions of public economy prevailed. 
 
 This vision of an ordered market delimited by the penal sanction 
dominates the public imagination today. We tend to view criminal law as 
the exceptional extremity to an otherwise unregulated orderly market, 
where there—and there alone—the state must intervene to calibrate the 
calculations of rational actors. This is reflected in the pervasive idea that 
fraud and coercion are the one major exception to unregulated markets. It 
is this precisely combination—order in the market and government at the 
border—that helped shape the modern neoliberal vision of penality. This 
is the view of Richard Posner, eloquently formulated on the front-piece 
of this manuscript and reproduced here:  
 
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to 
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary, 
compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit or implicit—in 
situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is 
a more efficient method of allocating resources than forced 
exchange… When transaction costs are low, the market is, 
virtually by definition, the most efficient method of allocating 
resources. Attempts to bypass the market will therefore be 
discouraged by a legal system bent on promoting efficiency.116  
 
In this passage, the idea of market efficiency leads into a penal 
theory akin to legal despotism: the only legitimate space where 
government can intervene is in the penal sphere. Elsewhere, it must leave 
alone voluntary, compensated exchanges—as if the space of the market 
existed somehow independently of the policing, as if the two domains 
were distinct. Richard Posner’s idea that crime can be defined as that 
which is not naturally efficient maps on remarkably to the Physiocratic 
idea that the homme pervers—the perverted man—is the one who does 
not abide by the natural order of the universe. Posner’s vision of the 
criminal law is incipient in the writings of the Physiocrats. Neoliberal 
                                                 
116 Posner 1985. 
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penality traces to the legal despotism of François Quesnay and Le 
Mercier de la Rivière.    
 
The new discourse of neoliberal penality facilitates the growth of 
the penal sphere. It makes it easier to resist government intervention in 
the marketplace and to embrace criminalizing any and all deviations 
from the market. It facilitates passing new criminal statutes and wielding 
the penal sanction more liberally—because that is where administration 
is necessary; that is where the state can legitimately act; that is the 
proper sphere of policing. In other words, the neoliberal vision not only 
goes hand-in-hand with a certain way of perceiving markets and 
history—of believing, for instance, that the early markets of the 
eighteenth century were regulated excessively and that ours today are 
free. It also facilitates the growth of the penal sphere. By marginalizing 
and pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, the neoliberal 
discourse fertilizes the penal sphere.  
  
Modern penal practices in the West are consistent with this, 
though I must emphasize that my intention is neither to make, nor to 
demonstrate a causal empirical link. The size and the cost of our 
neoliberal penal sphere in the West far exceeds those of earlier 
periods.117 In the United States, for instance, the twentieth century 
                                                 
117 This project focuses on a shift over time from an earlier penal rationality to 
neoliberal penality. As a result, it is important to compare modern neoliberal penal 
practices to earlier periods in the same neoliberal countries, such as the United States, 
Britain, or France. It is often tempting to compare modern neoliberalism to other 
contemporary discourses—such as socialist, or communist, or fundamentalist, or 
authoritarian—and to suggest that neoliberalism may be worse—or not. That it 
produces a larger penal sphere, more punishment, more incarceration—or not. For 
these comparisons, many rely on the fact that the United States leads the world in its 
rate of persons behind bars, and even in the raw number of persons in prison—taking 
the gold medal even in competition with a country like China that has a population over 
one billion, three hundred million, or about three-and-a-half times larger than the 
United States. Those comparisons between neoliberalism and other existing discourses, 
though, is not what motivates this project. This study is, in this loose sense, an internal 
critique of the direction that our discourse has taken, suggesting that it has gone in a 
direction that facilitates the growth of the penal sphere and that it could have gone in a 
very different direction, that it was in a very different place to begin with. It is not, 
again in a loose sense, an external critique in that it does not compare neoliberalism 
with other contemporary discourses and does not evaluate whether the former is 
“better” or “worse” in terms of its effects on the penal sphere. 
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experienced very high rates and costs of institutionalization—in both 
prisons and asylums. Prison populations skyrocketed beginning in 1970, 
rising from under 200,000 persons to more than 1.3 million in 2002. That 
year, our prison rate surpassed for the first time the 600 mark—600 
inmates per 100,000 adults. Including inmates in jail, the incarcerated 
population exceeded two million in 2001. In the 1930s, 40s and 50s, the 
United States also institutionalized people at high rates, but in state and 
county mental hospitals, institutions for “mental defectives and 
epileptics” and “the mentally retarded,” psychiatric wards in VA 
hospitals, as well as “psychopathic,” city, and private mental hospitals. 
When the data on these mental institutions are combined with the data on 
prison rates for 1928 through 2000, the rates of overall 
institutionalization in this country are staggering: in the period between 
1935 and 1963, the United States consistently institutionalized (in mental 
institutions and prisons) at rates above 700 per 100,000 adults—with 
highs of 778 in 1939 and 786 in 1955.  
 
In 2001, the fifty states spent a combined $38 billion on prisons 
alone.118 These numbers continue to rise sharply. California's annual 
prison budget for 2007-08 was almost $10 billion dollars in 2007, nearly 
twice as large as it was in 2001.119 For many states, the annual budget 
allocates more funding for prisons than for education.120 The numbers 
are often staggering.  According to a study released by the Department of 
Justice in 2004:  
 
Correctional authorities spent $38.2 billion to maintain the 
Nation’s State correctional systems in fiscal year 2001, including 
$29.5 billion specifically for adult correctional facilities. Day-to-
day operating expenses totaled $28.4 billion, and capital outlays 
for land, new building, and renovations, $1.1 billion. The average 
                                                 
118 Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, "Special Report: State Prison 
Expenditures, 2001," June 2004. Available at 
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf>. 
119 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, "2007-08 Budget 
Overview." Available at 
<http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BudgetRegs/budgetOverview0708.html>. 
120 Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, "Bulletin: State Spending More on 
Prisons than Higher Education," Nov 24, 2003. Available at 
<http://www.masstaxpayers.org/data/pdf/bulletins/11-24-
03%20Corrections%20Bulletin.PDF> 
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annual operating cost per State inmate in 2001 was $22,650, or 
$62.05 per day. Among facilities operated by the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons, it was $22,632 per inmate, or $62.01 per day.121 
 
With about one percent of the adult population in the United 
States behind bars, the size and cost of our penal sphere is undoubtedly 
greater than it was in earlier periods. And by “penal sphere,” I do not 
mean to create or reify a new category. I only mean to denote the costs 
and human capital associated with the criminal sanction. Those costs and 
that human capital are exceedingly large. This is consistent with the 
neoliberal penal vision: we are far more willing to spend dollars and 
allow the state to intervene in the penal sphere than we are in education 
or elsewhere, because that is where the government has a legitimate role. 
The federal bailouts of 2008 represent an exception to this logic;122 but 
they are exceptional and, in that sense, they prove the rule. Both sides of 
the political spectrum view the bailouts as “outrageous,” though 
necessary in a time of crisis to boost public confidence in the financial 
markets and ensure the continuing flow of credit to American 
homeowners.123 Most believe that the bailouts are temporary measures 
that will be followed by a return to normal. Even the New York Times 
editorial page assumes, for instance, that the nationalized Fannie and 
Freddie enterprises will eventually be privatized again.124 
  
I must emphasize that I am not making a causal claim. I do not 
contend that it is the discourse of neoliberalism that has fueled the 
                                                 
121 Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, "Special Report: State Prison 
Expenditures, 2001," June 2004. Available at 
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf>. 
122 The federal bailout of Bear Stearns cost approximately $29 billion; and as of the 
writing of this Article, the Treasury had spent approximately $6 billion on the Fannie 
and Freddie bailouts ($1 billion in preferred stock and $5 billion in mortgage-backed 
security buy-backs) and had committed to cover another $200 billion for future losses 
of debt holders and investors in junk mortgage-backed securities. The A.I.G. bailout is 
expected to cost $85 billion. Finally, the larger bailout proposal made on September 19, 
2008, is estimated at over $700 billion.  
123 Presidential candidate John McCain specifically referred to the federal bailout of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as “outrageous” in his Wall Street Journal op-ed on 
September 8, 2008; presidential candidate Barack Obama used similar language in his 
comments in Ohio that day.   
124 See New York Times editorial on the Monday following the Fannie and Freddie 
bailout announcements on September 8, 2008.   
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growth of our prison populations. It is not the logic that has caused mass 
incarceration; the war on drugs, the embrace of selective incapacitation 
theory, mandatory minimum sentences, and other practices are directly 
responsible for the exponential growth of our prisons, as other factors 
were directly responsible for the expansion of asylums and institutions 
for “the mentally defective.” My point, instead, is that the logic of 
neoliberalism facilitates these punishment practices by encouraging the 
belief that the legitimate space for government intervention is in the 
penal sphere—and there alone. The empirical evidence is at least 
consistent with this genealogy and does not, straight out, nullify the 
hypothesis.   
 
 
VII. 
 
Second. The rhetoric of neoliberalism naturalizes the market and thereby 
hides the massive redistribution that takes place there. It masks the 
state’s role, the state’s ties to non-state associations—associations such 
as the Chicago Board of Trade—and the extensive legal and regulatory 
framework that encases those associations. But is also hides the freedom 
that existed before. In other words, it masks both the amount of freedom 
in the earlier eighteenth century and the amount of regulation today.  
 
 On the one hand, there was far more “freedom” in the Parisian 
markets of the eighteenth century than we tend to acknowledge today. 
The ordinances and royal edicts were perceived as freedom enhancing by 
their defenders, especially Delamare and cameralists such as Beccaria. 
But even setting that aside, there were so many of these rules and 
regulations that they were, in fact, ineffective and hardly enforced. As 
Professor Olivier-Martin suggests, “the police regulations were 
innumerable under the ancient régime… and as a result, the relative 
impotence of the police is well established.”125 This is a phenomenon we 
know well in the criminal law context, where there has been such a 
proliferation of penal statutes that most are not enforced regularly and 
those that are, are often used for selective prosecutions. The Parisian 
ordinances were enforced mostly during times of scarcity, and there is 
good reason to believe that what the police was trying to achieve, more 
                                                 
125 Olivier-Martin 1988 :30.  
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than anything, was the appearance that they were doing something in 
response to a crisis. It should come as no surprise that during times of 
crisis, the state would intervene a bit more; that is precisely what 
happens in modern neoliberal states, such as in the United States during 
the savings and loan crisis or with the 2008 bailouts. Those 
interventions, while they temporarily weaken the claim that markets self-
adjust, are fleeting and have little impact on the discourse of 
neoliberalism.  
 
But even more important, the police matters in eighteenth century 
Paris were trivial. They involved fines only, and mostly minor fines, and 
triggered relatively minimal process. The police jurisdiction was 
essentially a civil, not a criminal, matter and for most of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries was part of the civil chamber. At various times, 
such as during the reforms of the Bureau de Police of 1572, the police 
was reduced essentially to street cleaning.126 The history of the founding 
of the police chamber reflects its secondary status. Louix XIV, after 
taking power in his own hands, turned first to finances, but then to 
justice and police matters. He created two special sessions of his council, 
one for matters of justice and one for matters of police. The first, the 
council on justice, he presided over himself on numerous occasions. It 
produced in 1667 the codification of rules of civil procedure, what was 
referred to as ‘ordonnance civile’, as well as, in 1670, the codification of 
criminal procedure—‘l’ordonnance criminelle.’ The second council on 
police, we know far less about, because it received so much less attention 
and Louis XIV never presided over the sessions. It was simply far less 
important.127 Louis XIV ultimately carved out the police chamber from 
within the civil lieutenant’s job description and second-seated the 
lieutenant de police.128 “The lieutenant de police will seat ordinarily at 
                                                 
126 Olivier-Martin 1988:99. 
127 Olivier-Martin 1988:103. Its sessions began in October 1666, and they met weekly 
until February 1667. Louis wanted reports and claimed that he was very interested in 
their deliberations—but did not preside. Colbert was present as well as le maréchal de 
Villeroy, and it contained eight counselors. 
128 According to Olivier-Martin, Louis eliminated the previous position of lieutenant 
civil du prévot de Paris and creates two positions:  “deux offices de lieutenants du 
prévot de paris: ‘notre conseiller et lieutenant civil dudit prévot… et notre conseiller et 
lieutenant du prévot de Paris pour la police.’” (104). « Le lieutenant civil sera chargé de 
la réception de tout ce qui concerne ‘la juridiction contentieuse et distributive’, à 
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the Châtelet in the chamber dite Chambre civile, and will dispose of a 
small office adjacent.”129 The police of the Châtelet was by no means 
what we could consider a criminal jurisdiction, levied only minor fines, 
if that, and took a second seat to both the criminal chamber and the civil 
chamber.  
 
A review of the archives of the Châtelet of Paris at the National 
Archives of France, the Série Y, reveals that the leading recurring 
violation that the commissioners noted on their rounds was the failure to 
sweep one’s storefront—the entry read “non balayé.” The papers, 
reports, and records of the police chamber read like those of a small 
claims court and present predominantly trivial matters. For instance, the 
carton of papers for the first six months of 1758—the carton labeled 
Y9459/A—contains month-by-month reports of the daily activity of the 
police commissioners and lists all the violations — the contraventions — 
that the commissioners observed. Most of the contraventions are for 
failure to sweep the side-walk. They read as follows: “Police des 8 et 9 
février 1758: Le devant de la porte du cabaret au merle blanc non balayé. 
Rue des francs Bourgeois: Le devant du cabaret de tardif aux fontaines 
de bourgogne non balayé.” And the list of “non balayé” goes on and on, 
interspersed with violations for individuals found gaming or drinking in 
cabarets past the closing hour. Here is the report of commissioner 
Dubuisson, returned at the audience of the police chamber on July 21, 
1758, archived in carton Y9459/B which covered the last six months of 
1758—a relatively typical entry: 
 
8 July 1758 – no violations 
10 said month – no violations 
11 said month – no violations 
12 s.m. – 3 cases of failure to sweep the street 
13 – nothing 
14 – nothing 
15 – nothing 
17 – nothing 
18 said month of July – 4 cases of failure to sweep 
19 s.m. – 8 cases of failure to sweep 
                                                                                                                       
l’exception de ce qui concerne la police Il précèdera le lieutenant de police dans toutes 
les assemblées, mais sans aucune dépendance ni autorité de l’un sur l’autre. » (104). 
129 Olivier-Martin 1988:105.  
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20 s.m. – nothing 
 
Here is the report of the same commissioner Dubuisson submitted to the 
police chamber the following week, July 28, 1758 : 
 
21 July – no violations 
22 same month – vehicle without plates or a number blocking 
public access ; stones left in disarray by a master mason blocking 
the streams ; neglected mound of gravel ; 2 cases of failure to 
sweep 
24 – nothing 
25 – nothing  
26 – wood and stones blocking the public way ; 4 cases of failure 
to sweep;  
28 s.m. – 3 cases of neglected gravel ; manure causing bad 
odors ; garbage thrown in our presence from the window of the 
second floor of the house occupied by the baker near the rue de 
la tinerandrie ; failure to sweep. 
 
No need to belabor the point: the records reflect predominantly minor 
and trivial violations when they reflect any at all. The contrast with the 
records of the criminal jurisdiction of the Châtelet of Paris is striking. A 
review of the carton for January and February 1760—carton Y9650—
discloses far more serious cases, with lengthy informations, 
interrogatories, and long indictments with numerous witnesses. The 
process and types of cases in the criminal files make the police chamber 
look like child’s play.  
 
Moreover, a careful review of the sentences meted out by the 
police chamber of the Châtelet reveals that the police des grains 
constituted a minor function of the chamber’s jurisdiction. These are 
preliminary findings from a larger on-going quantitative study of a 
collection of 932 sentences and ordinances from the police chamber 
meted out over the period 1668 to 1787, contained in two cartons, Y-
9498 and 9499 at the National Archives.130 Of the 932 records, 580 are 
                                                 
130 The data source are the 934 sentences and ordinances contained in the cartons and 
listed in the 1993 monograph by Henri Gerbaud and Michèle Bimbenet-Privat, Châtelet 
de Paris : Répertoire numérique de la série Y. Tome premiers. Les chambres. Y1 à 
10718 et 18603 à 18800 (Paris : Archives Nationales. At present, I am trying to unearth 
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police sentences, and of those, only 77 or 8.40% are related in some way 
to the cultivation and commerce of grain, to the market in grains, to 
bakers, millers, or other activities that have a bearing on bread, flour, or 
grain; with another 27 or 2.94% very tangentially related or touching in 
any way whatsoever on grain or bread. Of the 77 relevant sentences, only 
sixty resulted in fines. Within the category of the highest fines meted 
out—3,000 livres or more—grain-related offenses represented a small 
fraction of the whole, only 2 (or 5.4%) of 37 such fines. There was only 
one sentence of imprisonment meted out in the entire period, and it was 
for a servant who did not deliver goods—unrelated to the grain trade. I 
will be conducting far more research on this sample, but a preliminary 
assessment is that the police des grains represented a small fraction of 
the business of the lieutenant de police. 
 
 Overall, the archival records reveal a disproportionate number of 
terribly minor infractions and a relatively small place for the police des 
grains. As noted earlier, most of our knowledge of the Parisian grain and 
bread markets comes to us primarily through the eyes of liberal 
opponents of the regulations—Freminville and Afanassiev. They did a 
skilled job of picking out the sentences related to the police des grains 
from the haystack of police records. But we should be weary that so 
much of our understanding of the police des grains is filtered through the 
lens of these opponents—which seems to have produced such a morbid 
fascination with regimentation. Our perceptions of the importance of 
grain regulation may well be distorted by the personal biases of the 
historians and narrators of the field, either because they were 
ideologically opposed to the police des grains and had an interest in 
inflating the appearance of excessive regulation, or because they were 
themselves commissioners or lieutenants of the police—such as 
Delamare—and invested in the importance of their own functions.  
 
 On the other hand, there is also far more “constraint” in our 
contemporary markets than we typically tend to acknowledge today. The 
truth is, every action of the broker, buyer, seller, investment bank, 
                                                                                                                       
exactly how this collection was compiled since it does not contain all of the sentences 
and ordinances. There are several existing theories as to how the items were collected 
and they each impact differently on the randomness of the sampling. More on this soon, 
I hope.  For the moment, I am going on the assumption that the items are relatively 
randomly sampled, though that ultimately may not be the case.  
 
 
 
49 Bernard E. Harcourt 
 
brokerage firm, exchange member—even non-member—is scrutinized 
and regulated. The rules, oversight committees, advisory letters, 
investigations, as well as the legal actions, abound. The list of do’s and 
don’ts is extensive. Brokerage firms may combine and use black-lists to 
restrict retail buyers from reselling their public offering stock during a 
“retail restricted period” of between 30 and 90 days following their 
purchase of newly offered stock, but the same brokerage firms may 
allow large institutions to dump their stock in the aftermarket at any 
time.131 Exchange members on the New York Stock Exchange may get 
together and fix the commission rate on stock transactions of less than 
$500,000—i.e. set the price of buying and selling stock—but freely 
negotiate commissions in larger stock transactions.132 The National 
Association of Securities Dealers may combine and agree to restrict the 
sale and fix the resale price of securities of open-end management 
companies—“mutual funds”—in the secondary market between dealers, 
between dealers and investors, and between investors, thereby 
eliminating the secondary market in mutual funds—a market which was 
significant prior to 1940;133 and competing corporate take-over bidders 
may join together and make joint take-over offers to stockholders, even 
if it means that together they reduce the offering price for the stock 
purchase.134 But exchange members may not get together and disallow 
exchange members to share commissions earned from the purchase or 
sale of stock with non-member broker-dealers;135 and an exchange may 
not order its members to remove private telephone connections to the 
offices of nonmember brokers—unless the Securities and Exchange 
Committee reviews and approves such a policy.136 
 
 The rules and regulations surrounding our modern markets are 
intricate and often arcane, and they belie the simplistic idea that our 
markets are “free.” The reality is far more complex. It is interesting to 
note that this may also have been true with regard to the actual practices 
of the Physiocrats. They may have been far more constrained in their 
actions than they were in their rhetoric. This is certainly true of Le 
                                                 
131 Friedman 2002. 
132 Gordon 1975. 
133 NASD 1975. 
134 Finnegan 1990. 
135 Thrill 1970. 
136 Silver 1963. 
 
 
 
Neoliberal Penality 50 
 
Mercier de la Rivière, who served as intendant—administrative 
governor—of Martinique on two occasions during the early 1760s. By 
the time Mercier returned to Martinique on his second tour of duty in 
1763, he knew François Quesnay and had been converted to 
Physiocracy. In fact, Quesnay had originally recommended Mercier for 
the post in Martinique in 1759.137 At a time, then, when Mercier was 
preaching free markets, he was in fact practicing the police des grains. 
He was setting the price of bread and meat in Martinique, as evidenced 
by this fascinating ordinance signed by Mercier himself in 1763: 
 
No 271. Ordinance of MM., the General and Intendant (royal 
administrator), increasing the price of bread.  September 24, 
1763. 
 
The current price of wheat flour making it impossible for 
bakers to provide bread to the public at the specified price of 7 
sols 6 deniers per pound, at the ordinary weight of 16 ounces, we 
order that from this day forward, bakers will be held to furnish 
their bread at the weight of 14 ounces for 7 sols 6 deniers, and 
this shall continue until otherwise ordered by us…  
 
We promulgate this to the king’s prosecutors, etc. 
Rendered at Martinique, September 24, 1763. 
Signed, Marquis de Fenelon, et De La Rivière138 
 
 
Like Mercier de la Rivière, we today want to see freedom even 
when there is nothing but constraint in front of us. That desire, that urge 
to believe is precisely what masks the redistribution that accompanies the 
actual administration of contemporary markets. Because we want to 
believe that the markets are operating on their own, we let slide the 
actual cash flows and fail to properly scrutinize how the administration 
of the markets actually redistributes wealth. Because we want to believe 
in self-adjusting markets, we do not adequately investigate the 
consequences of our choices. There is a paragraph in the standard 
commodities futures contract on the Chicago Board of Trade that 
                                                 
137 May 1932:4. 
138 Durand-Molard 1807:Vol. II: 253-54. 
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provides that all grain shall be delivered in the City of Chicago. The City 
of Chicago has a finite capacity for warehousing grain, and is at a good 
distance from the corn, wheat, and soybean fields of Nebraska. That may 
increase the relative costs for the Nebraska farmer. The mere existence 
of standardized commodities futures contracts—which were first 
permitted in the twentieth century—tends to slightly reduce the mean 
price of commodities. This too may work to the detriment of the 
producer. These are some of the distributional consequences that go 
unexamined, precisely because we do not want to see all the choices that 
organize the market—because the market has been naturalized. The idea 
of natural order and, today, of market efficiency obfuscates these 
redistributions of wealth and resources.  
 
 
VIII. 
 
A word on method. I am by no means the first to toil in these fields and 
this project owes much to the ground-breaking work of Louis Dumont, 
Albert Hirschman, Karl Polanyi, Joseph Schumpeter, Luc Boltanski, and 
Michel Foucault, who have all contributed in important ways to our 
understanding of late modern capitalism. The objective of this particular 
project may be different, but naturally builds on their insights. This study 
seeks to explore the mode of rationality that made neoliberalism 
“natural” today—that naturalized our conception of the penal sphere as 
the outer limit of the free market, as the unique location where 
government intervention is automatically legitimate. The goal is not to 
offer a historical explanation why this mode of rationality developed, nor 
to propose a material explanation—whether economic or political—as to 
how the idea of natural order emerged. It is instead to trace how certain 
beliefs—for instance, the idea that the Parisian markets were 
overregulated and that our modern exchanges are free—became 
believable. How they became so obvious. And at what price.  
 
 Let me emphasize this last question—at what price—in part by 
drawing a contrast to Albert Hirschman’s brilliant essay, The Passions 
and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph. 
In his essay, Hirschman demonstrates how ideas evolve over time and 
argues that the “spirit of capitalism” grew and changed from within. The 
process, Hirschman argues, was “endogenous” to the reasoning and 
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rationality of the period. In contrast to Marxian analyses, which trace the 
emergence of capitalism to changes in material processes and class 
structures—to the end of feudal land relations and the rise of new modes 
of production—and in contrast to Weber, who traced the rise of 
capitalism to a new ethic of Protestantism, Hirschman traces a more 
continuous or seamless history of ideas, wherein self-interest came to be 
perceived as the useful passion that could be counted upon to rein in the 
less productive passions—like the passion for glory or lust. The theory of 
interests—and especially, the theories of self-interest represented in the 
“private vices-public virtues” of Mandeville and the “hidden hand” of 
Adam Smith—evolved as one conceivable way, a more auspicious way 
of dealing with excessive cultures of glory and passions such as lust. The 
other means that had been developed—such as repression of the passions 
or rehabilitation of the passions—were discussed, but seemed less likely 
to succeed than to pit one passion against the others.  
 
Hirschman’s story traces the history of how an idea became 
popular, and I embrace that method in one sense—insofar as this project 
too explores how the idea of natural order became dominant in our 
contemporary neoliberal imagination. At the same time, however, this 
project seeks to push the analysis further; to explore how the acceptance 
of those beliefs—beliefs in natural order and legal despotism—affects 
our contemporary social distributions. In other words, at what price? 
Ways of reasoning and seeing the world, I contend, facilitate certain 
material developments—whether inadvertently or knowingly. They 
make possible, they ease certain types of redistribution. We come to 
believe certain ideas, as Hirschman demonstrates well, but those beliefs 
have significant consequences.139 It is crucial not to lose sight of those.   
 
 At the same time, however, I acknowledge the limitations of pure 
idealism:  I do not believe that ideas have such real impacts on the world 
that they themselves or alone necessarily transform our practices. I do 
not believe that a new idea can change the way we produce, the way we 
work, the amount of work we do. I am not Weberian in the hard sense of 
                                                 
139 I should not that, as a substantive matter, in contrast to Albert Hirschman, I trace the 
shift most fundamentally to the birth of an autonomous, self-sustaining, and self-
regulating system that is naturally ordered—which, I argue, goes hand-in-hand with a 
transformation of the penal sphere. Punishment is necessary to enforce the borders of 
the system under this view. 
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The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Although this project 
focuses predominantly on the development of the ideas of natural order 
and legal despotism, and on their potential impact on our social 
distributions, this is not to deny the important influence of material 
changes, economic and technological shifts, and political transformation. 
The project does not centrally address those larger material 
transformations. That would simply be another project. In this sense, this 
project is neither merely a history of ideas nor an intellectual history, but 
also not a material explanation of how ideas evolve over time. It is 
instead a tracing—I might say genealogy—of how a certain set of beliefs 
became common and an analysis of how those beliefs might influence 
our practices. 
 
Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism 
is particularly enlightening in this respect. Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
work focuses precisely on the intersection of how new ideas—in their 
case, the 1960’s artistic and creativity critiques of fordist capitalism, with 
its principles of hierarchical organization—reshaped work practices into 
more fluid networks with greater roles for individual initiative, 
creativity, and autonomy, and thereby helped neutralize the thrust of the 
original critiques themselves. Boltanski and Chiapello take seriously 
how new ideas translate into practices, conducting a close reading of 
modern business management manuals to demonstrate how the ideas 
permeated the reasoning of management and influenced institutional 
organization.  
 
Michel Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and 
1979 are also enlightening. Not only did Foucault specifically address 
the Parisian bread markets of the eighteenth century, the birth of 
Physiocratic thought, and post-War American neoliberalism—including 
the seminal work on crime and punishment that Gary Becker penned in 
1968—but he also related neoliberal thought back to the early 
development of public economy. In his method too, Foucault drew, at 
least on one reading, on an age-old strain of nominalist thought that 
influences my work as well—a strain of thought that runs through the 
work of thinkers as far back as the Medieval Franciscan friar William of 
Occam, to the sixteenth century Renaissance essays of Michel de 
Montaigne, to the nineteenth century polemics of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
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This project continues in the furrow of that lengthy nominalist 
tradition. It starts by conceptualizing “natural order” and “market 
efficiency” as what William of Occam would have called “universals,” 
and then explores what work those universals are accomplishing. The 
answer that I develop in these pages reflects this nominalist influence: 
we have developed and deployed these universals to make sense of what 
are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena, to place discreet and 
divergent practices into a coherent framework, to deploy simple heuristic 
devices or stereotypes to expedite our evaluation and judgment. In so 
doing so, we have created structures of meaning that do work for us—at 
a steep price.  
 
The historian, Paul Veyne, in his recent book Foucault: Sa 
pensée, sa personne (2008), excavates a similar nominalist influence in 
the work of Foucault, drawing particular attention to the opening passage 
of Foucault’s 1979 lectures, Naissance de la biopolitique.140 In that 
opening lecture, Foucault steps back to explain and reframe his larger 
intellectual project and to place his writings within a methodological 
framework. The method in all his work, Foucault explains, had always 
been to start by doing away with the central explanatory concept, as a 
way to reexamine the work that the concept accomplished. Foucault 
lectured: 
 
I start from the decision, both theoretical and methodological, 
which consists in saying: suppose that the universals do not exist, 
and then I ask the question to history and historians: how can you 
write the history if you do not admit  a priori that something like 
the state, society, the sovereign, subjects exist? It is the same 
question that I posed  when I asked: … suppose that madness 
does not exist.141    
 
                                                 
140 I discuss this at greater length in my essay, “Supposons que la discipline et la 
sécurité n’existent pas ~ Rereading Foucault’s Collège de France Lectures (with Paul 
Veyne),” Paper prepared for Le Carcéral, Sécurité, and Beyond: Rethinking Michel 
Foucault’s 1978-1979 Collège de France Lectures, Conference at the Paris Center of 
the University of Chicago, June 5, 2008 (available here: 
 http://www.thecarceral.org/Harcourt_Foucault_Carceral_Notebooks_Draft.pdf).    
141 Foucault NB 2004b:5. 
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The use of the term “universals” is revealing and, as Paul Veyne 
suggests, the passage links Foucault back to the tradition of 
nominalism.142 Foucault’s method was to critically examine the very 
conceptions that we construct in order to learn something about 
ourselves.143 Foucault’s nominalism was fed, in part, by a large dose of 
skepticism—especially, of skepticism of the constructs of others, of 
those many universals. It is in this sense that Veyne correctly 
characterizes Foucault as a skeptic144—although it is important to keep 
nominalism and skepticism distinct and separate. In a similar vein, this 
project asks: suppose that “natural order” or “market efficiency” does not 
exist. What does that tell us about the way that we now understand the 
world? What work do those concepts perform? These questions too are 
nominalist and build on a centuries-old tradition of thought.  
 
Although this project shares a methodological sensibility with 
Foucault, this project breaks sharply from his analysis. More than 
anyone, Foucault reified the idea that the police des grains under the 
ancient régime was regulated excessively and he also strongly intimated 
that the modern economic sphere has been liberalized. Even though 
Foucault’s overarching project was to show that both were forms of 
governance, Foucault nevertheless created and deployed categories in a 
manner that is completely antithetical to this project. In his 1978 
lectures, Michel Foucault specifically deployed the category of discipline 
in its purest, most pristine form, to describe the grain trade.  
 
                                                 
142 Veyne 2008:19 (« Foucault est nominaliste comme Max Weber et comme tout bon 
historien. Heuristiquement il vaut mieux partir du détail des pratiques, de ce qui se 
faisait et se disait, et faire l’effort intellectuel d’en expliciter le discours. ») 
143 Foucault Dits et Ecrits IV: 726. Returning to this point several years later, in January 
1984, Foucault emphasized in an interview: « on m’a fait dire que la folie n’existait pas, 
alors que le problème était absolument inverse: il s’agissait de savoir comment la folie, 
sous les différentes définitions qu’on a pu lui donner, à un moment donné, a pu être 
intégrée dans un champ institutionnel qui la constituait comme maladie mentale ayant 
une certaine place à côté des autres maladies. » 
144 Of his skepticism, Veyne recalls : « Un soir où nous parlions du mythe, il me disait 
que la grande question, pour Heidegger, était de savoir quel était le fond de la vérité ; 
pour Wittgenstein, c’était de savoir ce qu’on disait lorsqu’on disait vrai ; ‘ mais à mon 
avis, la question est : d’où vient que la vérité soit si peu vraie ? ’; la vérité ou du moins 
les grandes vérités de chaque époque. »  (Veyne 2008:63). 
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La police des grains, Foucault explained in his lecture of January 
18, 1978, is the quintessential example of discipline and satisfies all three 
dimensions of the concept, discipline. First, the centripetal nature of 
disciplinary force: as Foucault explained, “discipline functions to the 
extent that it isolates a space, that it determines a segment. Discipline 
concentrates, focuses, and encloses. The first action of discipline is in 
fact to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of 
its power will function fully and without limit.”145 La police des grains 
was centripetal precisely in this sense, Foucault maintained. It turns 
inward onto a determined space and seeks to control, to dominate that 
circumscribed field. “It isolates, it concentrates, it encloses, it is 
protectionist, and it focuses essentially on action on the market or on the 
space of the market and what surrounds it.”146  
 
Second, the exhaustive nature of discipline: it seeks to regulate 
everything, to the smallest and most minute details. “Discipline allows 
nothing to escape,” Foucault explained. “Not only does it not allow 
things to run their course, its principle is that things, the smallest things, 
must not be abandoned to themselves. The smallest infraction of 
discipline must be taken up with all the more care for it being small.”147 
This is the notion of discipline as order maintenance.148 The police des 
grains is precisely about letting nothing escape the view of regulation, 
Foucault declared.  
 
Third, the prohibitive nature of discipline. “How basically does 
discipline, like systems of legality, proceed?” Foucault asked. “Well, 
they divide everything according to a code of the permitted and the 
forbidden. Then, within these two fields of the permitted and the 
forbidden, they specify and precisely define what is forbidden and what 
                                                 
145 Foucault 2007 STP:44-45 ; Foucault 2004 STP:46. 
146 Foucault 2007 STP:45; Foucault 2004 STP:46. 
147 Foucault 2007 STP:45; Foucault 2004 STP:47. 
148 This is the moment of discipline captured so well by Foucault in Discipline and 
Punish 1979:34—the moment, for instance, of the official opening on January 22, 1840, 
of Mettray, that juvenile prison qua home, school, military compound, courthouse and 
factory described in such chilling detail by Foucault in Discipline and Punish. It is 
discipline as originally described in the words of Ducpétiaux in 1852: “The least act of 
disobedience is punished and the best way of avoiding serious offences is to punish the 
most minor offences very severely.” 
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is permitted, or rather, what is obligatory.”149 Again, the police des 
grains could not come closer, Foucault maintained. It seeks to define 
these two spheres and then determine exactly which types of commercial 
behaviors are allowed and which prohibited.  
 
Foucault, more than anyone, reified the idea that the Parisian 
markets were excessively regulated with his use of the expression, “la 
police disciplinaire des grains”: “if we take again the example of the 
disciplinary police of grain as it existed until the middle of the eighteenth 
century, as set out in hundreds of pages in Delamare’s Traité de la 
police, we see that the disciplinary police of grain is in fact 
centripetal.”150 This project seeks precisely to demystify that claim.  
 
Similarly, with regard to modern markets, Foucault also reified 
the difference with the ancient régime. To describe modern market 
practices, Foucault abandoned the paradigm of discipline and fashioned a 
new category: sécurité. In his 1979 lectures, Naissance de la 
Biopolitique, Foucault analyzed the modern mode of rationality, which 
he called “liberalism,” under the rubric of sécurité—what he later called 
“gouvernementalité.”151 In his lectures, Foucault traced liberalism to the 
idea of “laissez-nous faire”: the idea of a self-limitation on governance. 
Liberal practices are characterized, according to Foucault, by explicit 
self-limitation, in contrast to the “raison d’État” of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, which sought an infinite objective. It is the project 
of “not governing too much,” in the words of Benjamin Franklin and the 
marquis d’Argenson.152 It traces back, Foucault said, to the birth of 
political economy: “Political economy, I think is fundamentally what has 
ensured the auto-limitation of governmental reason.”153 Listen to that: 
l’autolimitation de la raison gouvernementale. Even for Foucault, one of 
the sharpest critics of neoliberalism, there is a tangible substratum of 
liberty at play. There are new practices of liberalization. There are free 
movements and processes of free circulation of goods. “[L]iberalism – 
not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their 
                                                 
149 Foucault 2007 STP:46; Foucault  2004 STP: 47. 
150 Foucault 2007 STP:45 (emphasis added); Foucault 2004 STP: 46.  
151 Foucault 2004 STP:111 (substituting gouvernementalité  for the term sécurité). 
152 Foucault 2004 NB:27 n.10. 
153 “L’économie politique, je crois que c’est fondamentalement ce qui a permis 
d’assurer l’autolimitation de la raison gouvernementale” (Foucault 2004NB:1). 
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course; laisser faire, passer et aller – basically and fundamentally means 
acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course 
according to the laws, principles, and mechanism of reality itself.”154  
 
It is this “auto-limitation” that leads Foucault to name and deploy 
the new category of sécurité, which is different precisely in those three 
ways from discipline. First, whereas discipline cabined, concentrated, 
and enclosed its space of operation, sécurité is centrifugal: “The 
apparatuses of security . . . have the constant tendency to expand; they 
are centrifugal. . . . Security therefore involves organizing, or anyway 
allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.”155 Second, whereas 
discipline focused on even the smallest infractions, sécurité lets the small 
things go. “The apparatus of security . . . lets things happen. . . . allowing 
prices to rise, allowing scarcity to develop, and letting people go hungry 
. . .”156 Third, whereas discipline sought to eliminate and eradicate 
completely, sécurité in contrast tries only to minimize—to seek an 
optimal level of the targeted behavior, to achieve a certain equilibrium. 
Not to eliminate, but to regulate to an optimal level. Sécurité is 
pragmatic. It tries to figure out how to optimize. In sum, sécurité differs 
dramatically from discipline in its modes of functioning. For Foucault, 
the practices differ in fact. As Foucault explained: “An apparatus of 
security . . . cannot operate well except on condition that it is given 
freedom, in the modern sense that it acquires in the eighteenth century: 
no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the 
possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of 
both people and things.”157   
 
 My project is markedly different. The point is not to show that 
both the police des grains and neoliberalism are both forms of 
governmentality, but rather to show that neither can be categorized in 
those ways and that the categories of overly-disciplined and liberalized 
themselves are meaningless and obfuscate the real work that needs to be 
done. In this project, it is crucial to distinguish and carefully delineate 
practice from rhetoric—though they may well both constitute 
discourse—and to make sure we know exactly which one we are 
                                                 
154 Foucault STP 2007 :48; Foucault STP 2004: 49. 
155 Foucault STP 2007 :45 ; Foucault STP 2004 :46. 
156 Foucault STP 2007 :45 ; Foucault STP 2004:47. 
157 Foucault STP 2007 :48-49 ; Foucault STP 2004 : 50. 
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describing and comparing. It is, for example, far too easy to discuss 
Mercier de la Rivière’s written text, but ignore his actions as intendant of 
Martinique. One repeated difficulty with Foucault’s analysis in his 1978 
and 1979 lectures is that he contrasts the practices of the police des 
grains with the rhetoric of the Physiocrats. Foucault uses the concept of 
discipline to understand the practices as opposed to the rhetoric, of the 
police des grains; yet he uses the concept of liberalism as a way to 
understand the rhetoric of the Physiocrats and ignores their practice. The 
trouble is, the rhetoric of the police des grains was different than its 
practice, and the practices of the liberals were often different than their 
rhetoric. There is a sense that Foucault took neoliberals too much at their 
word. It is almost as if he suggested that liberal practices were in fact 
more liberal but that they should be understood as just another form of 
governmentality.   
 
This project is premised on the belief that we have no way of 
knowing whether our contemporary practices are more or less liberal, 
more or less freedom enhancing, more or less regulated. We have far 
more administration today than meets the eye or that we tend to 
recognize. Whether it amounts to more or less is impossible to quantify. 
But the fact is, we characterize these contemporary practices as more 
liberal—which is precisely the problem.  
 
 
IX. 
 
Under the entry “Grains” of the Encyclopédie volume published in 
1758, François Quesnay proposed that “It is quite sufficient that the 
government simply not interfere with industry,” “suppress the 
prohibitions and prejudicial constraints on internal commerce and 
reciprocal external trade,” “abolish or diminish tolls and transport 
charges,” and “extinguish the privileges levied on commerce by the 
provinces.”158 Quesnay’s vision of an economic system governed by 
natural order led to a political theory of “legal despotism” that would 
radically unbundle the earlier understanding of a overlapping 
relationship between public economy and the penal sphere. By relegating 
the state to the margins of the market and giving it free rein there and 
                                                 
158 Quesnay 2005:204-205. 
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there alone, the idea of natural order facilitated the unrestrained 
expansion of the penal sphere. It gave birth to neoliberal penality. 
 
 The hitch is that the foundational categories of, on the one hand, 
“natural order,” “market efficiency,” or “the free market,” and, on the 
other hand, “excessive regulation,” “governmental inefficiency,” or 
“discipline,” are illusory and misleading categories that fail to capture 
the irreducibly individual phenomena of different forms of market 
organization. In all markets, the state is present. Naturally, it is present 
when it fixes the price of a commodity such as wheat or bread. But it is 
also present when it subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat, 
when it grants a charter to the Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits 
trading of an instrument like a futures contract, when it protects the 
property interests of wheat wholesalers, when it facilitates the river 
transport of wheat, when it criminalizes the coordination of prices, when 
it allows the merger of grain companies, when it polices the timing of 
trades, etc. In addition, whenever the government is not itself regulating 
a market, it implicitly or explicitly delegates that authority to another 
entity. All markets are highly regulated. At the same time, in all markets, 
there is freedom. Even in a controlled economy where the price is fixed, 
there are variations in the quality of the goods sold and along other 
dimensions that create product differentiation. These produce cues at 
certain stores and not at others. Even in a highly criminalized economy 
where certain goods are outlawed, there are black markets that emerge 
and develop into robust trading markets where those illegal goods can be 
purchased and sold.  
 
 In the economic sphere, there is freedom and there is constraint. 
What we see is a reflection on us, not of the market. It makes little sense 
to describe one regime as free and another as regulated. All systems have 
complicated regulatory mechanisms that make the market function and 
dysfunction. What is most important is to remember that the categories 
we use to organize, understand, discuss, categorize, and compare the 
different organizing principles are just that—labels. They do not capture 
the true individuality of the objects described. And they have the 
unfortunate effect of obscuring rather than enlightening. They obscure by 
making one set of objects seem natural and necessary, and the other 
naturally unnecessary.  
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 This essay is a prolegomenon, a necessary first step in the 
direction of properly assessing modern forms of social and economic 
organization. Necessary, because of the deafening and dominant 
discourse of natural order and market efficiency. The very idea that we 
would use the term “free” to describe our current market system—a 
system which is regulated through and through—is a testament to the 
work that needs to be done. It may be fair to say that the Chicago School 
has so deeply and fundamentally warped our understanding of economic 
systems that it will take a lot of work to reach the point where we can 
properly assess different alternatives for the administration of markets 
and punishment, and dismantle our neoliberal penality. 
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